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In 2005 major reforms of the means-tested unemployment benefit system were implemented 
in Germany. One element of the reforms was to activate benefit recipients by a workfare pro-
gramme, the so-called One-Euro-Job programme. More than 600,000 benefit recipients en-
tered this programme in the year 2005. This paper investigates for a sample of means-tested 
unemployment benefit recipients the selection into One-Euro-Jobs in spring 2005 with the 
help of binary probit models. As there are substantial gender and regional effects, we estimate 
the selection equations for men and women in East and West Germany separately. 
Women have a lower probability of participating if they have a child under the age of three, 
whereas this makes no difference for men. Then, we find that young adults below 25 years 
begin a One-Euro-Job with a higher probability than other age groups. Moreover, special tar-
get groups such as individuals with migration background are not promoted with One-Euro-
Jobs. They participate with a lower probability than Germans without migration background. 
Overall, we conclude that a concentration on defined target groups cannot be observed. To 
analyse the sizable differences in participation probabilities of women in East and West Ger-
many a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of effects is applied. It turns out that the differences 
can partly be traced back to characteristics such as qualification and employment history and 
to the availability of child care facilities. 
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1  Introduction 
In recent years major reforms of the labour market (the so-called Hartz reforms) have been 
introduced in Germany with the scope of reducing the persistent high unemployment rates.
1 
One  of  the  reforms  was  implemented with the introduction of the Social Code II. A new 
means-tested benefit, the unemployment benefit II (UB II), was introduced in 2005 which 
replaced the unemployment and social assistance for employable persons in needy households. 
The Social Code II in contrast to the former system emphasises activation policies. As one 
means of activating unemployed a workfare programme called One-Euro-Jobs was introduced 
in 2005 which have been widely used since then. In 2006, more than 700,000 unemployed 
started a One-Euro-Job.  
As the programme is supposed to be used as a kind of last resort, special target groups for this 
programme are hard-to-place unemployed or those who are distant to the labour market. 
One-Euro-Jobs should enhance employability as well as reemployment chances. Another appli-
cation of this programme is the usage as a willingness-to-work test where no special target 
group is defined and unemployed with rather good labour market chances are also likely to 
participate. This paper investigates the selection into One-Euro-Jobs and how these different 
programme goals are reflected in the programme assignment. 
There are only a few studies that focus on programme selectivity. However, several reasons 
support the importance of selectivity studies (Heckman / Smith 2004). First, knowledge on 
selectivity can provide useful information on programme operations. E.g., are One-Euro-Jobs 
actually used as work tests or are they rather used as a kind of last resort for persons particu-
larly hard to place? Second, we can learn about inequality. Do specific groups, such as women 
or foreigners have the same chance (or “risk”) of participating as others? Third, it contributes 
to finding an adequate evaluation strategy used for determining the effects of the programme 
on participants’ employment outcome. Furthermore, questions about the participation prob-
ability of certain groups and why some are taking part less can be addressed here. One exam-
ple are West German women who have a very low participation probability. With the usage of 
a new application of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition analysis by Fairlie (2006) we explain 
this low participation in comparison to East German women. 
The paper is organised as follows: chapter two displays the institutional framework of the 
recent reforms and of One-Euro-Jobs, while chapter three summarises previous findings on 
participation structures and selectivity of public employment and workfare programmes. In 
chapter four we outline the theoretical framework and hypotheses. The method and data that 
we used are described in chapter five. This is followed by the results of the probit as well as 
the decomposition analysis in chapter six and a summary and conclusions in chapter seven. 
                                                 
1
   A comprehensive description of changes in labour market policies by the Hartz reforms can be found 
in Jacobi / Kluve (2007). IAB-Discussion Paper 8/2008 
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2  Institutional framework 
In January 2005 the last step of the Hartz reforms came into force in Germany and the Social 
Code II (“SGB II”) was introduced.
2 One main point of the reform was the consolidation of the 
former unemployment assistance and social assistance for employable needy persons to unem-
ployment benefit II (“Arbeitslosengeld II”). The reforms aimed at integrating more individuals 
into the labour market. This particularly concerns persons who were serviced by the social 
assistance offices before and who have not been working for a long period and thus are rather 
distant to the labour market.  
On the one hand, the new Social Code II challenges the efforts of unemployed people with 
regard to search for employment in the direction that e.g. unemployment benefits can be cut if 
efforts are too low. On the other hand, the reform provides more opportunities of assisting 
unemployed towards employment take-up. One option of promoting and challenging unem-
ployed people is public employment. Three similar types of public employment programmes 
exist within the Social Code II: First, there are the traditional job creation schemes (“Arbeits-
beschaffungsmaßnahmen”) that had already been part of the law of employment promotion 
(“Arbeitsförderungsgesetz”) in 1969. Second, two types of work opportunities have been intro-
duced in 2005: Contributory work opportunities with wage (“Arbeitsgelegenheiten in der Ent-
geltvariante”) and work opportunities with an allowance to unemployment benefits for addi-
tional expenses (“Arbeitsgelegenheiten in der Mehraufwandsvariante”), also known as One-
Euro-Jobs.
3 More than 95 % of work opportunities are One-Euro-Jobs, hence we concentrate 
on this programme. Table 1 shows that more than 600,000 unemployed in 2005 and more 
than 700,000 in 2006 started a One-Euro-Job. 
Table 1 
Entries into One-Euro-Jobs since introduction 2005 to October 2007 
  2005  2006 
Jan.- Oct.  
2007 
       
Total  603,771  704,477  604,461 
       
East Germany  287,872  297,979  242,102 
% of women  44.9  44.6  44.3 
       
West Germany  315,899  406,498  362,359 
% of women  34.2  35.0  36.5 
Source:  Statistics of the Federal Employment Agency, calculations from the Data Ware House
4 
 
                                                 
2
   A number of recent reforms are based on proposals of a commission, led by Peter Hartz, head of the 
personnel executive committee of Volkswagen. Many of the labour market reform elements proposed 
by this commission in the year 2002 were not entirely new, but were discussed already for quite so-
me time. 
3   Table 2 in the Appendix gives a list of characteristics of these three public employment programmes. 
4   The statistics on inflow and stocks exclude the 69 districts in which only local authorities are in 
charge of administering the unemployment benefit II. IAB-Discussion Paper 8/2008 
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One-Euro-Jobs aim at several goals: They are targeted on increasing the employability of long-
term unemployed people and enhancing their chances of finding regular employment (Bundes-
agentur für Arbeit 2005). Furthermore, they aim at integrating unemployed persons socially by 
providing them with a task and a daily routine. They are also used as means of testing an un-
employed person’s willingness to work. Moreover, public employment can be seen as a contri-
bution to the provision of public goods of the means-tested unemployment benefit recipients.  
One-Euro-Jobs are designed for employable means-tested benefit recipients between 15 and 
64 years. Jobs carried out within One-Euro-Jobs have to be additional and of public interest 
just as job creation schemes. They are subordinate to regular employment, vocational training 
and other active labour market programmes. This implies that persons with specific difficulties 
in finding regular employment should be more likely to participate in One-Euro-Jobs than 
those who have better chances of finding a job. One example for those particularly hard to 
place are persons with long (cumulated) periods of unemployment or those whose last regular 
employment is long ago. Those who have neither worked nor been registered unemployed in 
the years before the implementation are also far from the regular labour market. Moreover, 
the Federal Employment Agency defined special target groups for One-Euro-Jobs within the 
Social Code II compendium (Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2006a). These are young adults, unem-
ployed individuals with placement barriers, persons with migration background and older un-
employed persons. 
The selectivity analysis investigates if such target groups are really addressed by the pro-
gramme. However, the aim of One-Euro-Jobs to serve as willingness-to-work tests partly con-
flicts with the target group idea. It is one task of this study to reveal who is more probable to 
participate in One-Euro-Jobs and which aim is more prevalent.  
Participants receive an allowance of usually one to 1.5 Euros per hour worked additional to 
unemployment benefits. Organisations providing the work opportunity receive a lump sum 
covering the allowance and further costs (e.g. working clothes and training of participants) of 
carrying out One-Euro-Jobs. One-Euro-Jobs are not liable to social security. The duration of 
participation is typically up to six months and participation should be carried out in part-time 
(up to 30 hours per week) to make sure that participants are still able to apply for regular jobs. 
On average, weekly hours have been 28.9 in West and 27.7 in East Germany for the first six 
month in 2005 (Wolff / Hohmeyer 2006).  
3  Selectivity of public employment programmes in Germany 
Since Social Code II has just been introduced in 2005, very little research on the probability of 
recipients of unemployment benefits II to take part in active labour market programmes has 
been done. So far, no multivariate analysis on the participation probability exists for public 
employment programmes for means-tested unemployment benefit recipients. Recently, some 
descriptive  research  on  the  structure  of  participants  (inflow)  of  public  employment  pro-
grammes in 2005 has been published (Bernhard et al. 2006, Heinemann et al. 2006, Hohmeyer IAB-Discussion Paper 8/2008 
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et al. 2006, Wolff / Hohmeyer 2006). These studies identify potential target groups for public 
employment programmes on the basis of the stock of unemployed and the guidelines of the 
Federal Employment Agency and analyse in how far these target groups participate in the 
programmes. 
The two types of work opportunities appear to be very similar concerning their structure of 
participants: young persons under the age of 25 years start a work opportunity disproportion-
ately often. This fact can be traced back to the legal requirement that young persons have to 
be placed immediately to a job, to vocational training or to a work opportunity. Older unem-
ployed persons take up a work opportunity less often compared to their share in the unem-
ployed individuals. An exception are East German unemployed who are older than 57 years, 
who participate more often in One-Euro-Jobs compared to their share in the stock of unem-
ployed. This can be explained with the special promotion of this age group since July 2005 
when a special One-Euro-Job programme for this age group has been introduced. Women in 
West Germany less often start one of these programmes while East German women start them 
proportionately compared to their share in the unemployment stock. Women without voca-
tional training participate even less often while for men the share of participants without 
vocational training is about as high as their share in the unemployment stock. Overall, no con-
centration on target groups can be observed in these descriptive studies with the exception of 
young unemployed people. 
There are further programmes that are only partly comparable to One-Euro-Jobs. On the one 
hand, there are welfare-to-work programmes. On the other hand, there are job creation sche-
mes. One-Euro-Jobs lie somehow in between both programmes. That is why we shortly present 
selected selectivity results for job creation schemes as well as for workfare programmes. 
Research on job creation schemes is done for the group of unemployment insurance recipients 
and not for the means-tested unemployment benefit recipients that is analysed in this study. 
In various evaluation studies, Caliendo et al. (2004, 2005a, 2005b) and Caliendo (2006) ana-
lyse the participation probabilities of a sample of persons who are registered unemployed in 
January 2000 and receiving benefits using binary logit models. 
In West Germany, married persons (especially women) have a lower probability of participation 
whereas in East Germany the opposite holds. The authors presume that this is due to the ra-
ther traditional division of labour between men and women in West Germany or due to the 
different labour market situation in both regions. Assuming that married women are more 
likely to participate if their husband is unemployed, this could be the reason for the regional 
difference, considering that unemployment is higher in East Germany. However, the authors 
could not test this hypothesis with the data that was available to them. As there is more pre-
cise data on the household context available to us, we take a look on this hypothesis for the 
case of One-Euro-Jobs. IAB-Discussion Paper 8/2008 
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A higher level of education comes along with a higher probability to participate for women, 
while the effect for men is negative or zero. Work experience is associated with a lower par-
ticipation probability. Furthermore, there are some regional effects: while the participation 
probability in East Germany is higher if the labour market situation is worse, the participation 
probability of unemployed persons in West Germany rises if labour market prospects are good. 
Besides these few German studies about the selection into public employment schemes, there 
is some international evidence on the selection into workfare programmes. Handler (2003) 
surveys international workfare literature and compares selectivity of workfare programmes in 
the US and in Western Europe. He concludes that workfare participation is highly selective. He 
mostly ascribes this to service workers who prefer sending clients with better employment 
chances to a workfare programme (cream skimming). 
For several reasons, the multivariate selectivity analysis of One-Euro-Jobs in Germany is a new 
task as this is firstly a new programme, and secondly, there is generally not much evidence on 
programme selectivity and its cause. Furthermore, we want to examine if the results can be 
queued in the international workfare and public employment literature. 
4  Theoretical background  
Public employment has the scope of activating unemployed individuals. On the one hand, pub-
lic employment aims at raising the employability of participants and hereby enhancing their 
labour market chances. One-Euro-Jobs in particular have the goal of creating basic precondi-
tions for participants to take up jobs. For example, participants should get used to regular 
work schedules. Hence, this is most likely effective for those UB II recipients who are hard to 
place. Furthermore, such One-Euro-Jobs can also be used as a work test. Is the unemployed 
willing to work or able to follow a regular work schedule? This reason for an assignment into a 
One-Euro-Job may also count for unemployed with placement barriers and on the other hand 
for persons where illegal employment is assumed. Thus, the decision of which individuals are 
selected into the programme may also influence the effectiveness of public employment that 
is investigated by micro econometric studies (Hohmeyer / Wolff 2007). For such programme 
evaluation studies it is important to generate knowledge about the processes and mechanisms 
of placement into One-Euro-Jobs and the programme operation to apply a suitable evaluation 
strategy. This kind of research plays a crucial part in identifying problems of the current labour 
market reforms and their actual implementation.  
Heckman and Smith (2004) display the participation decision for a prototypical voluntary la-
bour market programme as a process of five steps that all have to be passed through so that 
participation takes places. Theses fives steps are: 1. eligibility, 2. awareness, 3. application, 4. 
acceptance and 5. enrolment. This concept can be applied to the typical situation of the selec-
tion into One-Euro-Jobs. However, the single steps cannot always clearly be disentangled. 
We have information on the participation decision from two different sources. First, we ana-
lysed  legal  requirements  and  documents  of the Federal Employment Agency. According to IAB-Discussion Paper 8/2008 
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them, eligibility is affected by legal requirements. Second, we conducted a survey of case 
managers in late 2005 (Wolff / Hohmeyer 2006). We firstly describe the five steps shortly ac-
cording to the two sources. This is followed by a more detailed description of each step. This 
survey showed that typically either an eligible (Step 1: eligibility) unemployed enquires about 
participation in a work opportunity or the participation in general is suggested by the case 
manager (Step 2: awareness). It is rarely the case that an unemployed person approaches his 
case manager with a concrete work opportunity that he has found. Typically, it is the case 
manager who proposes a concrete work opportunity to the unemployed needy person (see also 
the  suggestion  form  for  work  opportunities  on  the  homepage  of  the  Federal  Employment 
Agency) (Step 3: proposal), who then has to attend an interview with the operating establish-
ment (Step 4: interview and acceptance). If the unemployed individual is accepted by the es-
tablishment, he can start the One-Euro-Job (Step 5: enrolment). In our results, we cannot dis-
tinguish between the different steps. However, they make clear which mechanisms in a selec-
tion could be at work. They furthermore clarify that the selection into programme is no single 
event but a process. The selection depends on different restrictions, legislative, executive as 
well as judicial ones. 
Unemployed  individuals  do  not  necessarily  begin  a  One-Euro-Job  voluntarily,  as  this  pro-
gramme can also be used as a work test in order to check whether unemployed persons are 
available to job placement and willing to cooperate. A refusal to start a One-Euro-Job can be 
sanctioned with a cut of unemployment benefits.  
Step 1: Eligibility 
Unemployed individuals who receive UB II are eligible for participation in One-Euro-Jobs. As 
we consider only unemployed recipients of UB II we cannot regard the determinants of eligi-
bility. Although we do not look at this step, we can reasonably investigate the determinants of 
participation or as Heckman and Smith (2004) put it: “Getting these groups to participate in 
employment and training programs (…) requires more than just making them eligible for pro-
gram services.” Nevertheless, eligibility is regarded insofar as we consider the relevance of 
defined target groups for One-Euro-Jobs. 
Step 2: Awareness 
Due to high media coverage of One-Euro-Jobs a general knowledge can be presumed. How-
ever, it cannot be assumed that unemployed persons know in detail whether they are eligible, 
which types of One-Euro-Jobs exist and, e.g., for those who have small children what the op-
tions for child care are. According to Heckman and Smith (2004) we can expect that language 
skills, education and access to a network of persons who have heard of the programme or have 
participated themselves raise the likelihood that one knows about work opportunities. 
Furthermore, frequency of contacts to the local employment agency plays a role, because case 
managers should inform unemployed needy persons about One-Euro-Jobs. Therefore, we can 
assume that the person in a household, who is authorised to deal with the request for unem-
ployment benefits for the household, is more likely to be informed about work opportunities by IAB-Discussion Paper 8/2008 
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the case manager. Moreover, the awareness depends on the respective case manager and the 
local employment agency. The local employment agency determines the implementation of 
One-Euro-Jobs, e.g., by deciding how many unemployed are placed, who is placed (targeting) 
and what kind of One-Euro-Jobs are established. The case manager’s inclination to inform the 
unemployed about work opportunities is influenced by these decisions and of course by target 
groups that are required by law. The case manager is especially inclined if the unemployed 
belongs to a defined target group or if the unemployed has good prospects to be integrated 
into the regular labour market (cream skimming).  
Step 3: Proposal 
The likelihood to receive a proposal of a concrete One-Euro-Job is not only dependent on the 
inclination of the case manager but also on the availability of suitable positions. Hence, also 
individual characteristics are essential.  
Individual qualification may therefore be important. E.g., if there are One-Euro-Jobs with cer-
tain qualification requirements available, only qualified individuals may take part. That is why 
cream skimming may play an important role. Case workers may have an incentive to place 
rather highly skilled persons to a One-Euro-Job because integration into the labour market 
after the programme is easier to achieve for them than for persons with lower qualification 
and case managers are often evaluated by integration rates.
5 Furthermore, also the household 
context is likely to be important, e.g. the existence of (small) children in the household. If child 
care availability is a problem, it is less probable that persons with small children will get a 
proposal for a One-Euro-Job. This argument also holds for individuals who are currently work-
ing, predominantly in minor employment, and not earning enough to live on. They would not 
have the time to participate in a One-Euro-Job without giving up their present employment 
which (in the short run) would be efficient neither for themselves nor for employment agen-
cies. Moreover, the before mentioned use as a work test could motivate case managers to 
propose a One-Euro-Job to higher qualified persons. 
Furthermore, it is likely that defined target groups like for example young unemployed or for-
eigners will get a proposal for a One-Euro-Job as social worker should propose them.  
Step 4: Interview and acceptance 
The interview and then an acceptance decision follow the proposal. Therefore, it is highly likely 
that this also depends on personal characteristics. As the result of the interview not only de-
pends on the unemployed person but also on the firm side, it is likely that creaming could take 
place to some extent. However, it is also possible that no interview takes place and the social 
worker assigns some individuals directly to a One-Euro-Job. 
                                                 
5   As Handler (2003) shows this is also empirically relevant for several countries. IAB-Discussion Paper 8/2008 
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Step 5: Enrolment 
There is no random assignment like in the example of Heckman and Smith (2004). The actual 
enrolment after acceptance can only be prevented by failure to appear. This is influenced by 
health and opportunities of illegal employment. However, non-enrolment can be sanctioned by 
cuts in UB II payments. Therefore, it is again personal characteristics that count for enrolment. 
Someone who has to take care of anyone, e. g., for a child, is less likely to provoke such a be-
nefit sanction. 
5  Data and method 
5.1  Data 
For our analyses we are relying on a rich administrative dataset containing individual informa-
tion on personal characteristics and on the unemployment as well as the employment history 
(sample of the Integrated Employment Biographies IEB version 5.00). Moreover, there is this 
very same information also for the partner (not only married partner but partner living in the 
same household) of the unemployed individuals. This is only possible for the new data on un-
employment benefit II recipients because of the labour market reforms in January 2005 that 
defined neediness in a household context. We rely on the new UB II dataset ‘Leistungshistorik 
Grundsicherung’ (LHG version 1.00). Furthermore, we include information on regional labour 
market characteristics like the unemployment rate as well as the trend in the unemployment 
rate (on the district level). Also, regional labour market types developed by Rüb and Werner 
(2007) are included. Furthermore, we include regional information on the availability of child 
care facilities in districts (Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder 2004). 
We analyse a random sample from the unemployment stock on 31
st January 2005 who receives 
UB II. Participants start a One-Euro-Job between February and April 2005. Here, only the first 
programme start of the participants in this time frame is considered. Later programme starts 
in the same timeframe are therefore ignored. Non-participants do not start such an employ-
ment programme in spring 2005.
6 
The dataset contains 467,082 observations with 379,990 control individuals and 87,092 trea-
ted individuals. After excluding cases because of missing values in relevant covariates (7,045), 
an age restriction from 15 to 62 years (2,209), missing values because of the combination of 
IEB and LHG datasets (48,118), participation in ALMP on 31
st January 2005 (10,988) and not 
being unemployed directly before the programme start or virtual programme start (36,526) 
there remain 289,303 untreated individuals as well as 72,883 treated individuals. 
Because of the rich information in the dataset we include a variety of covariates we assume 
influencing the assignment into One-Euro-Jobs. First of all, we include socio-demographic 
                                                 
6
   The dataset only considers individuals not in the responsibility of districts or towns (69 out of 439) 
which are not cooperating directly with the Federal Employment Agency as the data was not avai-
lable. IAB-Discussion Paper 8/2008 
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variables on age, impairment of health and disability, nationality, marital status, children and 
qualification of the individuals.
7 Next, we consider variables on the unemployment history as 
cumulated unemployment duration, cumulated receipt of unemployment insurance (UI), cumu-
lated receipt of unemployment assistance (UA) and cumulated duration of out-of-labour force 
(neither being employed nor unemployed). We also include UI and UA receipt on 31
st December 
2004. Then, we incorporate variables on employment such as the cumulated regular employ-
ment duration as well as information on the last job (sector, firm size, earnings). Also, the 
distance to the labour market is regarded by using a variable on the duration since the last 
end of a job and a variable on the mean duration of last jobs. We also include, whether indi-
viduals have a minor employment (mini job) on 31
st January 2005. Only for women, we take 
into account if they are looking for a part-time job. Furthermore, there are variables on the 
history of the participation in active labour market programmes. Moreover, we consider several 
interaction terms with age: age interacted with regular employment in the past as well as the 
interaction between age and vocational training. The effects could be different for younger 
individuals because for them the probability is higher of not having any vocational training 
and longer regular employment spells. Then, we include some information about the partner, 
such as qualification, out-of-labour-force times and if the partner is unemployed on 31
st Janu-
ary 2005. Furthermore, we included the information on the share of children under the age of 
three who is looked after in a daycare facility.
8 And finally, we control for regional characteris-
tics  on  the  one  hand  with  the  local  unemployment  rate  and  its  trend,  the  vacancy-
unemployment ratio and its trend and the percentage of long-term unemployed and its trend. 
On the other hand, we also include the regional classification of labour market types according 
to Rüb and Werner (2007) into twelve district types. The descriptive statistics of the dataset is 
shown in Table 3 in the Appendix. 
5.2  Method 
The main question of our analysis is: what are the determinants for the participation in a One-
Euro-Job? As there are only two observable outcomes (participation and non-participation) the 
dependent variable is binary and can only take the values 0 or 1. Thus, there exists a class of 
binary choice models (Verbeek 2004) that cope with these challenges. These models describe 
the probability that yi equals 1: 
P{ yi = 1 | xi} = G(xi, b) 
The function G should only take on values in the interval [0,1]. Usually, functions of the form 
G(xi, b) = F(xi’ b) are chosen where F also has to be in the range of [0,1]. Commonly, the stan-
dard normal distribution is chosen leading to the so-called probit model.  
                                                 
7
   The variable if the person is the head of the household or authorised could not be included as there 
has not been any variance for participants. 99 percent of participants are the head of the household. 
8   We included the share for the year 2002, as no later years have been reported before 2005 (Sta-
tistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder 2004). IAB-Discussion Paper 8/2008 
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We estimate the selectivity into One-Euro-Jobs with the help of binary probit models and we 
take heterogeneity of participants into account by estimating separate models. We compute 
different models for men and women in East and West Germany for the following reasons: The 
unemployment rate in West Germany at 9.8 percent in the year 2005 is roughly half as high as 
that of East Germany.
9 Hence, the availability and use of One-Euro-Jobs as well as the selec-
tion into One-Euro-Jobs is probably different. We conduct separate estimates for men and 
women as the labour market behaviour is different for men and women.
10 We specify our 
models by assessing non-linearities in the set of independent variables. Therefore, we use sev-
eral dummy variables instead of ordinal or metric variables such as age or the cumulated un-
employment duration. Then, we test these dummy variables with Wald tests on equal coeffi-
cients in the categories. We proceed with the “from general-to specific” approach. We started 
with the most general model and the largest set of possible independent variables. Then, for 
testing hypotheses about the coefficients, we chose with the help of Wald tests a simpler and 
statistically valid specification.
11 In order to be able to interpret the coefficients not only for 
the sign, we calculated marginal effects. Except for regional variables, the variables in the 
equations are dummy variables. Therefore, the marginal effects are calculated at zero values of 
the covariates. For the regional variables, which are continuous, we calculated the marginal 
effects at the weighted means. 
As the treatment group is the population of programme starts in the mentioned time frame 
and the non-participants are only a sample, we use weighted models. Otherwise, the propor-
tion of transition from unemployment into One-Euro-Jobs would be overestimated. Hence, the 
coefficient for the constant in the probit regression would be biased and as a result, individual 
selection probabilities would be too high. Therefore, the marginal effects would also be esti-
mated inconsistently as they depend on the individual probabilities (King / Zeng 2001).  
6  Results 
In Table 4 in the Appendix, you can find the probit estimates for East and West Germany whe-
re the effect of gender is quantified. Tables 5 to 6 show the results for all four sub-groups: 
men and women in East and West Germany. During the next sections, we discuss the results, 
namely of the variable coherences we have derived within chapter 4. Other variables are im-
portant control variables as e.g. regional variables that are highly significant. Therefore, it is 
important to include them to control for regional impacts beyond East and West German dif-
ferences. 
                                                 
9
   The rate of registered unemployment is considered here. 
10   The effect of gender in a model with men and women is significant. West German women start a 
One-Euro-Job with a lower probability than West German men (see Table 4) 
11   We only excluded variables that have been tested out in all models, these are interaction terms with 
age and unemployment, programme participation during the last year as well as several partner vari-
ables (school, employment and unemployment). IAB-Discussion Paper 8/2008 
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We have explained different steps leading to One-Euro-Job participation. As we have not de-
fined a structural model we cannot disentangle the estimated effects and assign the results to 
a single step. We can only guess from the results that one of the steps may be more important 
than others. 
6.1  Socio-demographics 
Gender plays a role in the participation process. West German women participate with a 1.5 
percentage point lower probability in a One-Euro-Job than comparable West German men 
(Table 4). The relationship is the other way around in East Germany. Women in East Germany 
participate with a 0.63 percentage points higher probability than comparable men. These find-
ings that women in West Germany have a lower participation probability than those in East 
Germany are in line with results on other active labour market programmes and labour market 
orientation in general (Caliendo et al. 2004, Heinemann et al. 2006, Holst / Schupp 2001, 
Wanger 2005). They may be explained, e.g., by different labour market orientations of women 
as well as by different child care opportunities in both regions. To gain more certainty about 
the driving factors for the differences a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of the effects for lo-
git/probit models (Fairlie 2006) is conducted and described in Section 6.4. However, it is the 
group of West German women who in evaluation studies shows positive effects with respect 
to  the  regular  employment  rate  for  public  employment  programmes  such  as  job  creation 
schemes as well as One-Euro-Jobs (Caliendo et al. 2004; Hohmeyer / Wolff 2007). One expla-
nation for such positive results may be the selective usage of the instrument. We discuss here 
the results for the separate equations in order to get an explanation for this selection. 
The reference transitional probabilities are clearly higher for East Germany than for West Ger-
many (Tables 5 and 6). While in East Germany the reference transitional probabilities equal 
about twelve percent for men and women, in West Germany this probability is about five per-
cent for men and two for women. In East Germany, there are barely differences in reference 
transitional probabilities for both men and women whereas in West Germany such differences 
exist. 
Broadly speaking, the probability of participation decreases with age. The probability is highest 
for those unemployed individuals who are aged 24 or younger. Interestingly, there is no signifi-
cant difference between the reference group of 15 to 20 year olds and the age group 21 to 24 
years. For the older age groups the effects are clearly negative. This can be traced back to the 
legal requirement that says that unemployed persons below the age of 25 have to be placed to 
vocational training, employment or work opportunities immediately after having registered 
unemployed (§3 (2), Social Code II) which is operationalised by the Federal Employment Agen-
cy that no person below the age of 25 should be registered unemployed for more than three 
months (Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2006b). 
Besides the negative effect of age we have expected that there would be a weaker effect for 
persons who are 58 or older than for those between 51 and 57 years. Selectivity may already 
take place in the decision of older unemployed of being available for the labour market and IAB-Discussion Paper 8/2008 
 
16 
still registered as unemployed. There are special regulations for unemployed over 58 years who 
are allowed to orientate into retirement and do not have to sign an integration contract.
12 
Therefore, potential participants (“people at risk”) are differently motivated over the age of 58 
and are already a selective sample. However, a higher participation probability cannot be ob-
served. The marginal effect is slightly stronger negative than for the next younger age group. 
Probably, the number of observations for this age group is not large enough or case managers 
do not expect this age group to participate and thus One-Euro-Jobs are not used as a work 
test for them.  
Unemployed individuals with health problems or disability are potentially harder to place. Ho-
wever, they have even a slightly smaller probability to participate in a One-Euro-Job than un-
employed without any health constraints and are not especially promoted by these public em-
ployment programmes. 
Turning to the influence of nationality, we can state that Germans without migration back-
ground have the highest probability to be assigned into a One-Euro-Job. This is contrary to the 
before mentioned target groups (defined by the Federal Employment Agency). However, this is 
consistent with the hypothesis of Heckman and Smith (2004) that language skills matter for 
awareness of a programme which reduces participation probabilities of foreigners. Almost all 
analysed foreigner and migrant groups have a lower probability to participate compared to 
comparable Germans. The only exception is the case of unemployed people from the former 
Soviet Union in East Germany, where no significant effects occur. Turkish unemployed persons 
have the lowest participation probability compared to German unemployed.  
Singles do not seem to have a higher participation probability than unemployed persons with a 
partner; the effects are insignificant. The only exceptions are West German female singles who 
have a higher probability than women with a partner (1.8 percentage points). Married women 
have the lowest participation probability. For unemployed men it does not matter for their 
participation probability whether they have children or not. West German women have a 1.4 
percentage points lower probability to participate if they have a child of less than three years 
compared to women without children below three years. However, having children or not in 
general makes no difference for West German women. On the contrary, East German women 
with children have a higher inclination to start a One-Euro-Job than without (0.9 to 1.7 per-
centage points). Yet, they have an almost four percentage points lower likelihood to enter the 
programme with children younger than three years. This is remarkable as persons caring for a 
child younger than three years do not have to be available to job placement but can register as 
unemployed on a voluntary basis (§10 (1), Social Code II). Thus, one could assume that this 
group is particularly motivated (as argued before for older unemployed over 58 years). How-
ever, maybe it is the case managers who do not expect these women to participate in a One-
Euro-Job (for example, in the function of One-Euro-Jobs as work tests) or because of lacking 
                                                 
12
   This is regulated in § 65 Abs. 4 SGB II i. V. m. § 428 SGB III. IAB-Discussion Paper 8/2008 
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child care facilities. This points in the direction that the proposal may be an important step for 
the participation decision.  
Turning to qualification it becomes visible that there are also substantial differences for men 
and women. For men, there are merely no significant effects. In West Germany, there are ne-
gative effects for better educated men (with A-level or with GSCE and vocational training). 
Men in East Germany have a higher participation likelihood with secondary school degree than 
without. There are more significant effects for women, who have higher participation prob-
abilities with degree than without degree. The highest likelihood for West German women 
exists for those with a medium qualification compared to no qualification degree (0.7 percent-
age points higher for secondary school with vocational training with a reference probability of 
two percent). Better educated East German women have a higher inclination to start a One-
Euro-Job (more than four percentage points with a reference probability of 12 percent). Maybe 
for women without or with low qualification there is a lack of suitable One-Euro-Jobs or they 
orientate themselves less towards labour market participation. 
6.2  Labour market history 
Cumulated unemployment duration during the last year as well as during the last five years 
makes a difference for the assignment into One-Euro-Jobs. Unemployed individuals in all four 
sub-groups with a longer unemployment duration than six months during the last year are 
more likely to participate than individuals with a cumulated unemployment duration of less 
than six months. 
Persons with periods in which they have been out-of-labour-force are a target group of One-
Euro-Jobs as they are probably more distant to the labour market and first have to learn the 
preconditions for work. These periods in which persons have neither worked nor had to be 
available to the labour market may be plausible e.g. for spouses of former UA recipients (or of 
persons who have been employed before). Also young adults may be affected due to educa-
tion.
13 The results show that the existence of times without any registration in unemployment 
or employment has an impact on the participation. However, this is in the opposite direction 
than policy guidelines might suggest: Unemployed individuals with such gaps have a lower 
participation probability than individuals with no such gaps. However, the results are only 
significant until a certain cumulated duration (for women until 18 months, for men longer, 
however it is sporadically significant for East German men). Different results for these vari-
ables that represent the distance to the labour market may occur because the proxy for out-
of-labour-force probably does not measure exactly out-of-labour-force as also times of free-
lancing or for civil servants may be included in this variable. 
A higher cumulated duration of regular employment during the last five years in East Germany 
goes along with a lower probability to begin a One-Euro-Job. This points in the direction that 
                                                 
13 
  However, persons not registered may also be freelancer or civil servants. IAB-Discussion Paper 8/2008 
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persons with low labour market attachment are targeted which is actually one of the defined 
target groups. 
Regarding past participation in active labour market programmes one can observe that the 
number of past programmes is positively related to the participation probability for all groups. 
This can be regarded as a hint that “programme careers” exist. It could also be a hint that 
persons with difficulties of finding a job already participated in the past. However, the type of 
former programme matters: participation in job creation schemes (which are to some extent 
similar to One-Euro-Jobs) and other programmes increase the probability while private em-
ployment subsidies and start-up subsidies decrease the participation probability. 
There is a strong negative effect for minor employment on 31
st January 2005. This is only sur-
prising at first sight, because on the one hand the needy person should be available for the 
labour market and should be open to end his/her neediness. On the other hand, minor em-
ployment and One-Euro-Jobs are both part-time and could thus be combined within certain 
limits. However, both the labour market agency and the unemployed individual are better off 
with only minor employment and without One-Euro-Job: The unemployed person works less 
with approximately the same earnings. This is less expensive for the agency. Furthermore, One-
Euro-Jobs should be targeted at the hard-to-place individuals. However, are persons with a 
mini job really hard to place? Probably, they have better chances of reintegration coming from 
their minor employment. 
Furthermore, we controlled for variables concerning the last job. Regarding the industry of the 
last contributory job it becomes obvious that sectors like public administration, defence, social 
security, health care, education and other services come along with a higher probability of 
starting a One-Euro-Job compared to manufacturing whereas construction (in East Germany) 
and retail trade and hotels / restaurants (not for women in West Germany) come along with a 
lower participation probability. The overall impression is that probability is higher if the indus-
try of the last contributory job is a typical sector in which One-Euro-Jobs exist such as health, 
education and public administration.
14 This hints to the idea that only those unemployed are 
proposed for a One-Euro-Job and accepted who are qualified for the job, e.g. by former em-
ployment in the particular industry.  
6.3  Partner information 
Most of the variables with information about the partner do not have a significant influence. 
Concerning gaps in the employment and unemployment history, which are used as a proxy for 
out-of-labour-force, the probability to participate in East Germany is higher for individuals 
whose partner has no such out-of-labour-force times as there are negative signs for durations 
longer than zero. This is contrary to West Germany, where the participation probability is hig-
                                                 
14   Following Bellmann et al. (2006), One-Euro-Jobs are predominantly located in establishments belon-
ging to the industries of public administration, education, health and care and sports and culture. IAB-Discussion Paper 8/2008 
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her for individuals whose partner has out-of-labour-force times larger than zero. However, not 
all marginal effects are significant. Only the cumulated duration of 43 to 60 months out-of-
labour-force is significant for all four groups, negative in East Germany and positive in West 
Germany. 
There seems to be a difference in the assignment mechanism in both regions. In West Ger-
many, individuals whose partner is very distant to the labour market start a One-Euro-Job, 
whereas in East Germany this is the case for individuals with partners attached to the labour 
market or at least included in the labour market and employment statistics. 
Yet, the partner’s current unemployment does not seem to have any influence on the partici-
pation. This variable is not significant. Therefore, we cannot support the hypothesis raised by 
Caliendo et al. (2004) that women in West Germany are more likely to participate if their 
partner is unemployed (see chapter 3). 
Also, the qualification of the partner has no significant effect. But the effect is significant and 
negative in West Germany for individuals whose partner has only missing information on the 
qualification and for those whose partner has no identification number. The latter could also 
be a sign of the partner being very distant to the labour market which supports the above 
mentioned relationship for West Germany. 
6.4  Decomposing participation differences 
Analyses of the participant structure show that West German women have a much lower pro-
bability of starting a One-Euro-Job than all other groups, thus compared to West German men 
but also compared to East German women (Bernhard et al. 2006, Wolff / Hohmeyer 2006). 
Why should women in different regions in Germany have different participation probabilities? 
There could be various reasons for these differences. On the one hand, differences in the char-
acteristics of women in both regions like the higher educational level or the larger availability 
of child care facilities in East Germany could account for those differences. On the other hand, 
differences in the process of selection could be responsible for the gap such as regional differ-
ences in the labour market orientation of women or how they are treated by the case workers.  
The decomposition analysis technique by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) can be used to 
differentiate between such effects caused by group differences in the distribution of the co-
variates X (“characteristics effect”) and caused by differences in the process determining the 
participation (“discrimination effect”). Fairlie (2006) extended this technique which was de-
signed for linear regressions for the decomposition of estimates of probit and logit models. 









W = D + Q 
where P
E is the average probability of women in East Germany to start the programme and P
W 
the same for West German women. The effect D due to differences in unobserved characteris-IAB-Discussion Paper 8/2008 
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tics (often labelled as ”discrimination effect”) is defined by the difference of the participation 
probability  of  East  German  women  (P
E)  and  the  participation  probability  of  East  German 
women if they behaved (or were treated) like West German women (P
E
W). The effect Q due to 
differences in characteristics can be written as the difference between participation probabil-
ity of East German women if they behaved like West German women (P
E
W) and the participa-
tion probability of West German women (P
W). In this term the coefficients are held constant. It 
indicates the extent to which different probabilities starting a One-Euro-Job can be attributed 
to different observed characteristics of the participants in East and West Germany.
15 
We concentrate on the effect Q as we are interested in the differences caused by observable 
variables. We disaggregate Q in the contributions of the single covariates included in the ana-
lyses. Here, we rely on the covariates from the probit models except for the regional classifica-
tion of labour market types that differs in East and West. Results are displayed in Table 7.
16 
Women in East Germany have a 4.4 percentage points higher probability of starting a One-
Euro-Job than West German women (7.0 % compared to 2.6 %). More than half of the differ-
ence (63.1 %) between the two groups can be explained by differences in the covariates. 
Characteristics effects account for a difference in probabilities of 2.8 percentage points. One 
explanation of the difference is the higher share of child care facilities in East Germany. This 
higher share explains more than six percent of the complete gap in the participation probabili-
ties. Furthermore, structural differences in the population of unemployed benefit recipients 
can explain the difference to some extent. For example, distinct levels of qualification account 
for almost 15 % of the differences in the participation probability. The higher level of qualifi-
cation of East German Women can be seen as one main reason for the higher probability to 
start a One-Euro-Job of this group. These results are in line with results on female labour mar-
ket participation in general in East and West Germany (Grundig 2007). 
Besides, the participation gap can be partly explained by differences in unemployment dura-
tion as well as nationality. For example, the higher share of foreigners in West Germany ac-
counts for 10.2 % of the differences in the participation probabilities. 
The unexplained part can probably be traced back to general differences in the intensity of 
labour market policies between East and West Germany as the participation rate is generally 
higher in East Germany. 
                                                 
15   One may also want to compare men and women in West Germany directly. These results are not 
discussed here and are available on request. 
16
  We display results in three versions: the two different decomposition bases East and West as well as 
estimates from a pooled sample of the two groups. The latter specifies that the coefficients from the 
pooled model over all cases are used for the decomposition. However, we concentrate in the discussi-
on on the results in the first column (East Germany as base). We used the ado-procedure fairlie.ado 
which we amended in order to include population weights. IAB-Discussion Paper 8/2008 
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7  Summary and conclusion 
In this paper the determinants for unemployed means-tested benefit recipients of starting a 
One-Euro-Job in spring 2005 are analysed. Furthermore, we wanted to find out whether un-
employed with specific problems and unemployed belonging to defined target groups are espe-
cially focussed by One-Euro-Jobs. For the analyses, the method of probit analyses has been 
applied to estimate the determinants of starting a One-Euro-Job for men and women in East 
and West Germany using rich administrative datasets. The results in the overall model showed 
that women in West Germany have a much lower probability than men to participate. How-
ever, East German women have a higher participation probability than East German men. As 
selection appears to be different for men and women and in order to investigate these differ-
ences, we estimated the models separately for men and women. 
Gender specific differences become apparent when considering the impact of children on par-
ticipation probabilities. For men, children do not make any difference for the likelihood of tak-
ing up a One-Euro-Job but they do for women. While children in general do not have an im-
pact on the participation probability of West German women, they increase the chances for 
East German women. However, both have a lower likelihood of participating if their children 
are younger than three years. This is remarkable as persons caring for a child with less than 
three years do not have to be available to job placement but can register as unemployed on a 
voluntary basis. Thus, one could assume that this group is particularly motivated. However, 
maybe the probabilities are lower because of lacking child care facilities or because of the case 
managers who do not expect these women to participate in a One-Euro-Job (for example, in 
the function of One-Euro-Jobs as work tests). 
Turning to qualification it becomes visible that the focus on target groups is even worse for 
women than for men. Men in West Germany have a lower participation probability with higher 
qualification. For men in East Germany, there are merely no effects of qualification whereas 
women have higher participation probabilities with a degree than without one. It could be the 
case that there is a lack of suitable One-Euro-Jobs for women without or with low qualifica-
tion or that these women orientate themselves less towards labour market participation. 
From analyses of the participation structure of One-Euro-Jobs we know that East German 
women have a significantly higher likelihood of participating than West German women. We 
employed a decomposition analysis to investigate to which extent this difference can be at-
tributed to differences in observed characteristics. In our sample the participation probability 
differs by 4.4 percentage points between East and West German women. More than half of the 
differences can be explained by differences observed in the values of the covariates.  
One element is child care facilities which are traditionally more prevalent in East than in West 
Germany (Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder 2007) and thus enable women to 
participate in the labour market. Furthermore, results show that women without a vocational 
degree are less likely to participate in a One-Euro-Job. In West Germany in 2005, 64 % of 
unemployed women receiving UB II do not have a qualificational degree. This share is twice as IAB-Discussion Paper 8/2008 
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high as in East Germany where only 32 % of unemployed and needy women do not have a 
degree (Wolff / Hohmeyer 2006). A decomposition analysis shows that these differences can 
account to some extent for the differences in the female participation rates between the two 
German regions. Qualification can account for nearly 15 % of the differences and child care 
facilities for further 6.6 %. In addition, differences in participation probabilities can be ex-
plained partly by the structure of unemployed benefit recipients concerning for example un-
employment history and nationality. 
Besides gender, age is an important determinant of participation in a One-Euro-Job. The high-
est probability of participating can be found for unemployed and needy persons below the age 
of 25 probably due to the legal requirement (§3 (2), Social Code II). Thus, young unemployed 
people are reached as a special target group but not those who are 50 years and older. Despite 
their definition as a target group of One-Euro-Jobs foreigners except for those from the former 
Soviet Union in East Germany have a lower probability of participating than Germans without 
migration background. This may hint to the importance of language skills. If you consider peri-
ods of un- and non-employment in the past as an indicator for labour market distance, the 
impression is ambiguous. While the cumulated duration of unemployment increases the par-
ticipation probability, periods out-of-labour force reduce the probability. So, we cannot clearly 
say whether One-Euro-Jobs focus on persons who are particularly hard to place. Further selec-
tion mechanisms are supposed to be at work. 
Besides the investigation of the concentration of One-Euro-Jobs on target groups we find 
several further interesting aspects of selectivity of the programme. First, we find support for 
the existence of programme careers: The number of participations in active labour market 
programmes in recent years increases the probability of participating in a One-Euro-Job. Type 
of programme matters: while participation in job creation schemes and other programmes 
increase the likelihood, private employment subsidy and start-up subsidy decrease the prob-
ability. Second, there is a strong negative effect for minor employment on 31
st January 2005. 
This is only surprising at first sight, because on the one hand the needy person should be avail-
able for the labour market and should be open to end his/her neediness. However, both the 
labour market agency and the unemployed individual are in many cases financially better off 
with only minor employment than with a One-Euro-Job. Furthermore, One-Euro-Jobs should 
be targeted at the hard to place individuals. Third, concerning the industry of the last con-
tributory job it becomes obvious that sectors like public administration, defence, social secu-
rity, health care, education (only in West Germany) and other services increase the probability 
of starting a One-Euro-Job compared to manufacturing as a last sector whereas construction 
(in East Germany) and retail trade and hotels / restaurants (not for women in West Germany) 
decrease the probability. The participation probability seems to be higher if the last sector is a 
typical sector for One-Euro-Jobs such as health, education and public administration. 
So overall, we conclude that target groups are reached only partially. This is in line with results 
from international workfare studies. Whether this is due to the use of One-Euro-Jobs as a 
work test or due to cream skimming by case managers or firms or caused by other factors can-IAB-Discussion Paper 8/2008 
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not  be  answered  here.  Our  results  cannot  show  which  step  in  the  theoretical  framework 
mostly influences the participation as all steps should influence the assignment itself. As spe-
cial target groups are not fully reached with One-Euro-Jobs, it is likely that also the interac-
tion of different steps plays an important role. However, we suggest that the proposal in the 
local employment agency could be very important as the following steps are based on this 
decision and the case managers have the opportunity to anticipate the following steps.  
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Public employment programmes 
Programme  Characteristics 
Job creation schemes  -  additional works of public utility 
-  wage subsidies 
-  Participant receives usual wage. 
-  Subject  to  social  security  contribution  except  unemployment 
insurance 
-  Duration of up to twelve months 
Work opportunities with wage  -  Not necessary additional works of public utility 
-  wage subsidies 
-  Participant receives usual wage. 
-  Subject to social security contribution  
-  Duration of less than twelve months 
One-Euro-Jobs  -  additional works of public utility 
-  lump sum to the organisation that covers allowance and further 
costs of carrying out one Euro Jobs. 
-  Participant receives allowances of one to two Euros per hour 
additional to unemployment benefits II. 
-  No contribution to social security  
-  Duration of normally up to six months 
 




Descriptives for men and women in East and West Germany 
Men Women Men Women
Age in years
15-20 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,04
21-24 0,09 0,07 0,07 0,07
25-30 0,12 0,10 0,13 0,13
31-35 0,11 0,12 0,13 0,13
36-40 0,14 0,16 0,15 0,16
41-45 0,17 0,18 0,16 0,16
46-50 0,15 0,15 0,13 0,13
51-57 0,18 0,18 0,17 0,16
58-62 0,02 0,01 0,02 0,03
impairment of health or disabled 0,14 0,10 0,18 0,12
Nationality
German without migration background 0,91 0,92 0,73 0,73
German with migration background 0,02 0,03 0,06 0,06
Turkish 0,02 0,01 0,08 0,07
Soviet Union 0,01 0,02 0,03 0,04
other foreigners 0,03 0,03 0,11 0,10
No partner 0,60 0,54 0,60 0,63
Partner, not married 0,11 0,11 0,07 0,07
Children
No children 0,76 0,48 0,75 0,61
One child 0,13 0,27 0,11 0,21
Two children 0,08 0,18 0,09 0,12
Three and more children 0,04 0,07 0,06 0,06
Child under three years (yes) 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01
Vocational Education
no secodary schooling degree/no vocational training 0,13 0,12 0,23 0,28
Secondary school, no vocational education 0,12 0,11 0,28 0,28
Secondary school, vocational education 0,30 0,21 0,29 0,20
GCSE, no vocational training 0,05 0,06 0,04 0,05
GCSE, vocational training 0,34 0,45 0,08 0,11
A-levels, no vocational training 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,02
A-levels, vocational training 0,02 0,02 0,03 0,03
A-levels, college 0,03 0,02 0,03 0,03
Cumulated duration of unempl., 02/2004 to 01/2005
0 to 6 months 0,15 0,17 0,20 0,40
7 to 12 months 0,85 0,83 0,80 0,60
Cumulated duration of unempl., 02/2000 to 01/2005
0 months 0,05 0,08 0,08 0,27
1 to 6 months 0,07 0,08 0,10 0,14
7 to 18 months 0,20 0,18 0,26 0,23
19 to 24 months 0,12 0,10 0,13 0,09
25 to 30 months 0,13 0,11 0,11 0,07
31 to 36 months 0,14 0,12 0,10 0,06
37 to 48 months 0,28 0,33 0,23 0,14
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Table 3   continued 
Descriptives for men and women in East and West Germany 
 
 
Men Women Men Women
out-of-labour force during last year 0,21 0,20 0,29 0,44
Cum. dur. neither empl. nor job-seeker, 01/2000 to 12/2004 (out-of-
labour-force)
0 months 0,42 0,48 0,28 0,21
1 to 6 months 0,27 0,18 0,33 0,20
7 to 12 months 0,10 0,06 0,10 0,08
13 to 18 months 0,04 0,04 0,06 0,06
19 to 24 months 0,04 0,05 0,04 0,05
25 to 30 months 0,02 0,04 0,03 0,05
31 to 36 months 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,05
37 to 42 months 0,02 0,03 0,03 0,05
43 to 60 months 0,06 0,09 0,09 0,25
Cum. dur. of UI receipt from 02/2004 to 01/2005
0 months 0,78 0,82 0,77 0,80
1 to 6 months 0,15 0,12 0,15 0,13
7 to 9 months 0,05 0,04 0,05 0,04
10 to 12 months 0,03 0,02 0,03 0,03
Cum. dur. of UI receipt from 02/2000 to 01/2004
0 months 0,29 0,38 0,35 0,55
1 to 3 months 0,08 0,11 0,08 0,06
4 to 12 months 0,44 0,41 0,44 0,31
13 to 18 months 0,13 0,07 0,10 0,06
> 18 months 0,05 0,03 0,04 0,03
Cum. dur. of UA receipt from 02/2004 to 01/2005
0 months 0,19 0,24 0,24 0,51
1 to 3 months 0,07 0,05 0,07 0,05
4 to 6 months 0,10 0,08 0,09 0,06
7 to 9 months 0,11 0,08 0,10 0,07
10 to 12 months 0,53 0,55 0,50 0,31
Cum. dur. of UA receipt from 02/2000 to 01/2004
0 months 0,29 0,30 0,37 0,61
1 to 6 months 0,10 0,07 0,12 0,08
7 to 12 months 0,09 0,07 0,10 0,06
13 to 30 months 0,27 0,25 0,21 0,13
31 to 42 months 0,15 0,18 0,10 0,06
43 to 48 months 0,10 0,14 0,11 0,06
UI ben. receipt, Dec. 31st 2004 0,04 0,04 0,03 0,04
UA ben. receipt, Dec. 31st 2004 0,78 0,74 0,73 0,47
Cumulated dur. of regular employment 01/2000 to 12/2004
0 months 0,44 0,61 0,36 0,50
1 to 6 months 0,17 0,13 0,14 0,10
7 to 12 months 0,11 0,08 0,10 0,08
13 to 18 months 0,11 0,08 0,13 0,11
19 to 24 months 0,06 0,04 0,09 0,06
25 to 30 months 0,04 0,03 0,07 0,05
31 to 42 months 0,05 0,03 0,09 0,06
43 to 60 months 0,02 0,02 0,03 0,03
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Table 3   continued 
Descriptives for men and women in East and West Germany 
Men Women Men Women
Interaction terms with age below 25
Under 25, no voc. training 0,07 0,05 0,08 0,09
Under 25, no regemp 0,07 0,07 0,05 0,07
Under 25, up to 12 months regular employment 0,04 0,02 0,03 0,02
Under 25, more than 12 months regular employment 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,02
ALMP participation in the last five years (yes)
Job creation schemes 0,28 0,26 0,07 0,03
Private employment subsidy 0,10 0,07 0,07 0,03
Further vocational training 0,21 0,22 0,15 0,11
Retraining 0,04 0,03 0,04 0,03
Short-term training (classroom) 0,31 0,35 0,32 0,24
Short-term training (practical) 0,10 0,07 0,09 0,05
Other short-term training 0,02 0,01 0,02 0,01
Startup subsidy 0,02 0,01 0,03 0,01
Private placement service (§37), some tasks of placement 0,03 0,03 0,06 0,04
Private placement service (§37), all tasks of placement 0,05 0,04 0,04 0,03
Other ALMP 0,06 0,07 0,06 0,06
Time since end of last ALMP
1 to 6 months 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
7 to 12 months 0,19 0,17 0,17 0,13
13 to 24 months 0,14 0,13 0,12 0,09
> 24 months 0,16 0,15 0,13 0,09
Number of ALMPs  in last five years
No programme participation 0,27 0,29 0,37 0,54
One 0,27 0,27 0,28 0,23
Two 0,22 0,22 0,17 0,12
Three 0,13 0,13 0,09 0,06
Four  0,06 0,06 0,04 0,03
Five and more 0,05 0,04 0,04 0,02
Last professional status
blue-collar worker 0,33 0,21 0,51 0,25
Skilled worker / foreman 0,29 0,12 0,17 0,04
White-collar worker 0,09 0,20 0,11 0,18
Part-time 0,17 0,30 0,07 0,21
No job yet 0,11 0,17 0,14 0,33
Firm size of last contributory job
1 to 20 employees 0,27 0,21 0,29 0,21
21 to 50 employees 0,13 0,10 0,14 0,10
51 to 100 employees 0,12 0,11 0,12 0,09
101 to 400 employees 0,22 0,24 0,18 0,16
> 400 employees 0,11 0,14 0,11 0,09
Missing 0,04 0,03 0,04 0,03
No job yet 0,11 0,17 0,14 0,33
Last regular monthly real wage (deflated with CPI, 2000=100)
Zero 0,03 0,04 0,05 0,07
>0 to 500 Euro 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,07
>500 to 1000 Euro 0,26 0,33 0,12 0,18
>1000 to 1500 Euro 0,36 0,32 0,24 0,19
>1500 to 2000 Euro 0,13 0,06 0,22 0,10
> 2000 Euro 0,06 0,03 0,18 0,06
Time since end of last contributory job
1 to 6 months 0,13 0,09 0,10 0,08
7 to 12 months 0,09 0,07 0,07 0,06
13 to 24 months 0,17 0,14 0,17 0,14
25 to 36 months 0,14 0,12 0,15 0,11
37 to 48 months 0,11 0,10 0,12 0,08
> 48 months 0,25 0,30 0,25 0,21
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Table 3   continued 
Descriptives for men and women in East and West Germany 
Men Women Men Women
Average duration of contributory jobs between 01/2000 and 
12/2004
1 to 6 months 0,27 0,18 0,24 0,17
7 to 12 months 0,25 0,21 0,21 0,15
13 to 24 months 0,16 0,17 0,17 0,14
25 to 36 months 0,03 0,03 0,04 0,04
37 to 60 months 0,02 0,01 0,02 0,02
Missing 0,17 0,22 0,17 0,15
Number of contributory jobs in last five years
None 0,28 0,39 0,31 0,48
One 0,41 0,41 0,37 0,30
Two 0,24 0,16 0,23 0,16
Three or more 0,08 0,04 0,09 0,06
Minor employment, Jan. 31st 2005 0,07 0,13 0,09 0,14
Partner's cum. Dur. Neither empl. Nor job-seeker nor 
unemployment benefit receipt (proxy for out-of-labour force), 
01/2000 to 12/2004
0 months 0,14 0,18 0,04 0,08
1 to 24 months 0,11 0,16 0,09 0,15
25 to 30 months 0,02 0,01 0,02 0,01
37 to 42 months 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,01
43 to 60 months 0,12 0,10 0,22 0,10
No partner 0,60 0,54 0,60 0,63
Partner education
No secodary schooling degree/no vocational training 0,04 0,04 0,10 0,08
Secondary school, no vocational education 0,05 0,05 0,07 0,09
Secondary school, vocational education 0,05 0,10 0,03 0,06
GCSE or A-levels, vocational education or college 0,11 0,12 0,03 0,03
Partner without bak_id 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
No ieb_konto_id 0,05 0,06 0,06 0,04
Missing 0,09 0,10 0,12 0,06
Partner unemployed, Jan. 31st 2005 0,21 0,24 0,16 0,22
Looking for part-time job  0,06 0,22
Proportion of childcare under 3 37,49 37,70 3,69 3,88
No job yet 0,11 0,17 0,14 0,33
Job with missing sector 0,11 0,16 0,13 0,12
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, energy and water supply 0,07 0,05 0,02 0,00
Food and tobacco 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,02
Wood, paper, publishing, printing 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,01
Chemical industry, engineering, vehical construction 0,01 0,00 0,03 0,01
Other manufacturing 0,04 0,03 0,07 0,04
Construction 0,16 0,03 0,10 0,01
Wholesale trade and car sales 0,02 0,01 0,05 0,03
Retail trade and hotels/restaurants 0,04 0,10 0,07 0,11
Transport and communication 0,03 0,01 0,05 0,02
Services for companies 0,13 0,09 0,17 0,12
Public adminstration, defence, social security agencies 0,06 0,07 0,03 0,02
Education 0,06 0,06 0,03 0,03
Health care, veterinarian and social services 0,03 0,07 0,04 0,08
Other services 0,12 0,12 0,05 0,06
Local unempl. rate in January 2005 22,87 22,99 13,03 13,17
%age change in local unempl. rate in January 2005 8,31 8,24 14,83 16,40
Percentage of LTU in Jan. 2005 39,85 40,05 33,47 32,74
total %age change of percentage of LTU in Jan. 2005 -3,01 -2,77 0,00 -1,11
Vacancy-unemployment ratio  in January 2005 0,01 0,01 0,04 0,04
%age change vacancy-unemployment ratio  in January 2005 -10,50 -10,34 -7,88 -9,54
Cities with below average LM conditions, high LTU 0,42 0,40 0,19 0,19
Urban areas with average labour market cond. 0,01 0,01 0,17 0,17
Rural areas with below average LM conditions 0,09 0,09 0,04 0,04
Rural areas in East Germany with severe LM conditions 0,32 0,32 0,00 0,00
Rural areas in East Germany with svery evere LM conditions 0,16 0,18 0,00 0,00
Cities in West Germany with average labour market conditions 0,00 0,00 0,18 0,18
Cities in West Germany with above-average labour market conditions 0,00 0,00 0,05 0,05
Rural areas in West Germany with average LM conditions 0,00 0,00 0,19 0,17
Rural areas in W. G. with above average LM conditions and high seasonal dynamics 0,00 0,00 0,05 0,06
Rural areas in W. G., very favourite LM cond., seasonal dynamics and low LTU 0,00 0,00 0,04 0,05
Rural areas in W. G., very favourite LM cond. and low LTU 0,00 0,00 0,09 0,09
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Probit Estimates for East and West Germany 
 
marginal effect SE marginal effect SE
Reference transitional probability 0.1093 0.0639
Age in years (reference is 15 to 20 years)
21-24 -0.0013 0.0043 -0.0043 0.0023
25-30 -0.0923 *** 0.0082 -0.0458 *** 0.0047
31-35 -0.0880 *** 0.0079 -0.0457 *** 0.0047
36-40 -0.0867 *** 0.0078 -0.0447 *** 0.0046
41-45 -0.0855 *** 0.0077 -0.0437 *** 0.0046
46-50 -0.0848 *** 0.0077 -0.0456 *** 0.0047
51-57 -0.0873 *** 0.0079 -0.0504 *** 0.0051
58-62 -0.0966 *** 0.0087 -0.0578 *** 0.0057
Impairment of health or disabled -0.0087 *** 0.0018 -0.0081 *** 0.0012
Nationality (reference is German)
German with migration background -0.0275 *** 0.0038 -0.0127 *** 0.0018
Turkish -0.0574 *** 0.0055 -0.0306 *** 0.0028
former Soviet Union -0.0086 0.0045 -0.0179 *** 0.0024
Other foreigners -0.0481 *** 0.0046 -0.0250 *** 0.0023
Women (yes) 0.0063 *** 0.0014 -0.0153 *** 0.0015
No partner -0.0012 0.0039 0.0143 0.0028
Partner, not married 0.0004 0.0021 0.0072 *** 0.0018
Children (reference is no child)
One child 0.0085 *** 0.0018 0.0004 0.0012
Two children 0.0133 *** 0.0023 -0.0004 0.0014
Three and more children 0.0037 0.0028 0.0010 0.0018
Child below three (yes) -0.0153 ** 0.0056 -0.0096 ** 0.0030
Vocational Education (reference is no secondary schooling degree/
no vocational training)
Secondary school, no vocational education 0.0124 *** 0.0027 0.0034 ** 0.0011
Secondary school, vocational education 0.0203 *** 0.0027 0.0030 * 0.0012
GCSE, no vocational training 0.0071 * 0.0032 0.0011 0.0019
GCSE, vocational training 0.0177 *** 0.0025 0.0003 0.0016
A-levels, no vocational training -0.0057 0.0066 -0.0071 ** 0.0027
A-levels, vocational training 0.0200 *** 0.0048 -0.0020 0.0022
A-levels, college 0.0024 0.0043 -0.0097 *** 0.0024
Cumulated duration of unempl., 02/2004 to 01/2005 (reference is 0 to 6 months)
7 to 12 months 0.0272 *** 0.0031 0.0154 *** 0.0020
Cumulated duration of unempl., 02/2000 to 01/2005 (reference is none)
1 to 6 months 0.0182 *** 0.0042 0.0193 *** 0.0026
7 to 18 months 0.0157 *** 0.0045 0.0214 *** 0.0029
19 to 30 months 0.0214 *** 0.0050 0.0239 *** 0.0033
31 to 36 months 0.0141 ** 0.0053 0.0183 *** 0.0035
37 to 48 months 0.0081 0.0053 0.0195 *** 0.0037
Out-of-labour force during last year -0.0103 *** 0.0020 -0.0060 *** 0.0012
Cum. dur. neither empl. nor job-seeker, 01/2000 to 12/2004 (out-of-
labour-force) (reference is none)
1 to 6 months -0.0125 *** 0.0017 -0.0056 *** 0.0011
7 to 12 months -0.0157 *** 0.0027 -0.0129 *** 0.0018
13 to 18 months -0.0123 *** 0.0033 -0.0099 *** 0.0020
19 to 24 months -0.0071 * 0.0036 -0.0072 ** 0.0022
25 to 30 months -0.0122 ** 0.0040 -0.0079 ** 0.0024
31 to 36 months -0.0065 0.0045 0.0002 0.0026
37 to 42 months 0.0026 0.0051 0.0015 0.0028
43 to 60 months -0.0091 0.0051 -0.0003 0.0028
Cum. dur. of UI receipt from 02/2004 to 01/2005 (reference is none)
1 to 6 months -0.0084 ** 0.0026 -0.0037 * 0.0017
7 to 9 months -0.0089 * 0.0040 -0.0073 ** 0.0025
10 to 12 months -0.0045 0.0054 -0.0021 0.0033
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Table 4    continued 
Probit Estimates for East and West Germany 
 
marginal effect SE marginal effect SE
Cum. dur. of UI receipt from 02/2000 to 01/2004 (reference is none)
1 to 3 months 0.0015 0.0025 0.0018 0.0018
4 to 12 months -0.0007 0.0022 -0.0013 0.0016
13 to 18 months 0.0093 ** 0.0032 -0.0031 0.0020
> 18 months 0.0014 0.0040 -0.0036 0.0028
Cum. dur. of UA receipt from 02/2004 to 01/2005 (reference is none)
1 to 3 months 0.0042 0.0051 0.0046 0.0032
4 to 6 months 0.0029 0.0049 0.0006 0.0030
7 to 9 months -0.0097 * 0.0047 -0.0072 * 0.0029
10 to 12 months -0.0078 0.0048 -0.0039 0.0030
Cum. dur. of UA receipt from 02/2000 to 01/2004 (reference is none)
1 to 6 months -0.0072 * 0.0028 -0.0028 0.0017
7 to 12 months -0.0106 *** 0.0031 -0.0041 0.0019
13 to 30 months -0.0151 *** 0.0031 -0.0086 *** 0.0020
31 to 42 months -0.0198 *** 0.0037 -0.0147 *** 0.0026
43 to 48 months -0.0247 *** 0.0042 -0.0213 *** 0.0030
UI ben. receipt, Dec. 31st 2004 -0.0065 0.0044 0.0055 0.0031
UA ben. receipt, Dec. 31st 2004 0.0221 *** 0.0044 0.0098 *** 0.0027
Cumulated dur. of regular employment 01/2000 to 12/2004 (reference is none)
1 to 6 months 0.0057 * 0.0025 0.0084 ** 0.0027
7 to 12 months -0.0026 0.0027 0.0046 0.0027
13 to 18 months -0.0109 *** 0.0030 0.0051 0.0030
19 to 24 months -0.0175 *** 0.0037 -0.0003 0.0031
25 to 30 months -0.0239 *** 0.0042 -0.0008 0.0035
31 to 42 months -0.0345 *** 0.0046 -0.0039 0.0036
43 to 60 months -0.0512 *** 0.0062 -0.0158 *** 0.0040
Interaction terms with age below 25
Under 25, no voc. training -0.0094 * 0.0039 -0.0027 0.0026
(reference is under 25, no regular employment)
Under 25, up to 12 months regular employment -0.0156 *** 0.0045 -0.0105 *** 0.0027
Under 25, more than 12 months regular employment -0.0141 * 0.0058 -0.0094 ** 0.0029
ALMP participation in the last five years (yes)
Job creation schemes 0.0156 *** 0.0028 0.0209 *** 0.0030
Private employment subsidy -0.0219 *** 0.0026 -0.0094 *** 0.0018
Further vocational training 0.0041 * 0.0019 0.0029 * 0.0013
Retraining -0.0063 * 0.0032 0.0000 0.0021
Short-term training (classroom) -0.0037 * 0.0018 0.0033 * 0.0013
Short-term training (practical) -0.0056 * 0.0023 0.0038 * 0.0016
Other short-term training 0.0031 0.0047 0.0067 * 0.0029
Startup subsidy -0.0334 *** 0.0043 -0.0230 *** 0.0026
Private placement service (§37), some tasks of placement -0.0086 * 0.0034 -0.0054 ** 0.0018
Private placement service (§37), all tasks of placement -0.0039 0.0029 -0.0051 ** 0.0019
other ALMP 0.0274 *** 0.0038 0.0226 *** 0.0028
Time since end of last ALMP (reference is 1 to 6 months)
7 to 12 months 0.0177 *** 0.0026 0.0116 *** 0.0018
13 to 24 months 0.0097 *** 0.0024 0.0082 *** 0.0017
> 24 months 0.0027 0.0020 0.0053 *** 0.0015
Number of ALMPs  in last five years (reference is none)
One 0.0186 *** 0.0027 0.0114 *** 0.0018
Two 0.0332 *** 0.0040 0.0173 *** 0.0026
Three 0.0374 *** 0.0050 0.0235 *** 0.0035
Four  0.0407 *** 0.0060 0.0278 *** 0.0043
Five and more 0.0428 *** 0.0069 0.0387 *** 0.0054
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Table 4    continued 
Probit Estimates for East and West Germany 
 
marginal effect SE marginal effect SE
Industry of last contributory job (reference is manufactoring)
Job with missing sector -0.0114 ** 0.0041 -0.0005 0.0027
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, energy and water supply -0.0049 0.0037 0.0244 *** 0.0042
Food and tobacco -0.0091 0.0060 -0.0008 0.0032
Wood, paper, publishing, printing 0.0045 0.0081 -0.0006 0.0035
Chemical industry, engineering, vehical construction 0.0038 0.0075 0.0001 0.0030
Construction -0.0177 *** 0.0036 0.0010 0.0022
Wholesale trade and car sales -0.0082 0.0050 -0.0043 0.0024
Retail trade and hotels/restaurants -0.0208 *** 0.0039 -0.0034 0.0021
Transport and communication -0.0084 0.0045 -0.0063 ** 0.0024
Services for companies -0.0036 0.0035 0.0056 ** 0.0019
Public adminstration, defense, social security agencies 0.0252 *** 0.0043 0.0382 *** 0.0042
Education 0.0005 0.0039 0.0252 *** 0.0037
Health care, veterinarian and social services 0.0212 *** 0.0043 0.0313 *** 0.0034
Other services 0.0083 * 0.0035 0.0120 *** 0.0025
Last professional status (reference is blue-collar worker)
Skilled worker / foreman -0.0058 *** 0.0017 -0.0075 *** 0.0013
White-collar worker -0.0035 0.0020 -0.0099 *** 0.0014
Part-time -0.0003 0.0017 -0.0039 ** 0.0013
No job yet -0.0049 0.0064 0.0012 0.0040
Firm size of last contributory job (reference is 1 to 20 employees)
21 to 50 employees 0.0047 * 0.0021 0.0057 *** 0.0014
51 to 100 employees 0.0031 0.0021 0.0083 *** 0.0016
101 to 400 employees 0.0014 0.0018 0.0050 *** 0.0013
> 400 employees -0.0047 * 0.0021 0.0037 * 0.0016
Missing -0.0040 0.0032 -0.0018 0.0022
Last regular monthly real wage (deflated with CPI, 2000=100) (reference is none)
>0 to 500 Euro 0.0122 ** 0.0044 0.0159 *** 0.0028
>500 to 1000 Euro 0.0217 *** 0.0037 0.0183 *** 0.0025
>1000 to 1500 Euro 0.0216 *** 0.0036 0.0200 *** 0.0024
>1500 to 2000 Euro 0.0105 ** 0.0038 0.0133 *** 0.0022
> 2000 Euro -0.0006 0.0043 0.0041 0.0021
Time since end of last contributory job (reference is 1 to 6 months)
7 to 12 months 0.0063 * 0.0030 -0.0001 0.0018
13 to 24 months 0.0103 *** 0.0029 -0.0013 0.0016
25 to 36 months 0.0063 * 0.0029 -0.0010 .
37 to 48 months 0.0014 0.0030 -0.0056 ** 0.0019
> 48 months -0.0005 0.0032 -0.0089 *** 0.0022
Average duration of contributory jobs between 01/2000 and 12/2004 (reference is 1 to 6 months)
7 to 12 months 0.0063 ** 0.0020 0.0003 0.0014
13 to 24 months 0.0090 *** 0.0027 -0.0028 0.0018
25 to 36 months 0.0125 * 0.0049 -0.0079 ** 0.0028
37 to 60 months 0.0179 * 0.0074 -0.0044 0.0037
Number of contributory jobs in last five years (reference is none)
One -0.0048 0.0036 -0.0078 * 0.0031
Two 0.0047 0.0045 -0.0076 * 0.0035
Three or more 0.0082 0.0054 -0.0051 0.0038
Minor employment, Jan. 31st 2005 -0.0496 *** 0.0039 -0.0300 *** 0.0027
Partner's cum. Dur. Neither empl. Nor job-seeker nor unemployment 
benefit receipt (proxy for out-of-labour force), 01/2000 to 12/2004 (reference is none)
1 to 24 months -0.0051 * 0.0021 0.0017 0.0021
25 to 30 months -0.0049 0.0052 0.0136 ** 0.0042
31 to 36 months -0.0086 0.0054 0.0112 ** 0.0041
37 to 42 months -0.0083 0.0058 0.0162 *** 0.0043
43 to 60 months -0.0111 *** 0.0031 0.0168 *** 0.0025
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Table 4    continued 
Probit Estimates for East and West Germany 
 
marginal effect SE marginal effect SE
Partner education (no secodary schooling degree/
no vocational training)
Secondary school, no vocational education 0.0016 0.0039 0.0008 0.0019
Secondary school, vocational education 0.0025 0.0037 0.0010 0.0024
GCSE or A-levels, vocational education or college 0.0000 0.0034 -0.0020 0.0027
Partner ID is missing -0.0019 0.0047 -0.0162 *** 0.0026
Partner ID available but partner education is missing -0.0066 0.0039 -0.0094 *** 0.0021
Partner unemployed, Jan. 31st 2005 -0.0050 * 0.0025 -0.0028 0.0017
Regional variables (district level)
Local unempl. rate in January 2005 -0.0016 *** 0.0003 0.0018 *** 0.0002
%age change in local unempl. rate in January 2005 -0.0012 *** 0.0002 -0.0008 *** 0.0001
Percentage of LTU in Jan. 2005 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0007 *** 0.0001
Total %age change of percentage of LTU in Jan. 2005 -0.0020 *** 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001
Vacancy-unemployment ratio  in January 2005 0.5957 *** 0.1019 -0.0571 0.0168
%age change vacancy-unemployment ratio  in January 2005 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 *** 0.0000
(reference is Cities with below average 
LM conditions, high LTU)
Urban areas with average LM conditions 0.1051 *** 0.0113 0.0229 *** 0.0023
Rural areas with below average LM conditions 0.0509 *** 0.0041 0.0260 *** 0.0035
Rural areas in East Germany with severe LM conditions 0.0312 *** 0.0028
Rural areas in East Germany with very severe LM conditions 0.0102 ** 0.0031
0.0002 *** 0.0001 0.0021 *** 0.0001
Cities in West Germany with average LM conditions 0.0169 *** 0.0022
Cities in West Germany with above-average LM conditions 0.0441 *** 0.0042
Rural areas in West Germany with average LM conditions 0.0518 *** 0.0042
Rural areas in W. G. with above average LM conditions and high 
seasonal dynamics 0.1051 *** 0.0076
Rural areas in W. G., very favourite LM cond., seasonal dynamics 
and low LTU 0.0717 *** 0.0063
Rural areas in W. G., very favourite LM cond. and low LTU 0.0730 *** 0.0059
Proportion of childcare under 3 0.0002 *** 0.0001 0.0000 *** 0.0000
AIC 71439.10 56961.48
BIC                  72960.36 58568.38
Number of Observations 153722 205871
Log of the Likelihood -35566.55 -28323.74
Pseudo R²            0.0714 0.0856
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001




Probit Estimates for men and women in East Germany 
 
                    
                     marginal effect SE marginal effect SE
Reference transitional probability 0.1148 0.1140
Age in years (reference is 15 to 20 years)
21-24             -0.0037 0.0063 0.0018 0.0063
25-30             -0.0970 *** 0.0122 -0.0953 *** 0.0120
31-35             -0.0923 *** 0.0117 -0.0914 *** 0.0116
36-40             -0.0911 *** 0.0116 -0.0900 *** 0.0115
41-45             -0.0883 *** 0.0113 -0.0900 *** 0.0115
46-50             -0.0882 *** 0.0113 -0.0882 *** 0.0113
51-57             -0.0908 *** 0.0116 -0.0909 *** 0.0116
58-62             -0.1010 *** 0.0128 -0.1007 *** 0.0128
Impairment of health or disabled  -0.0073 ** 0.0024 -0.0104 *** 0.0030
Nationality (reference is German)
German with migration background  -0.0239 *** 0.0056 -0.0339 *** 0.0058
Turkish           -0.0614 *** 0.0080 -0.0565 *** 0.0084
former Soviet Union      -0.0125 0.0068 -0.0064 0.0065
other foreigners  -0.0556 *** 0.0069 -0.0408 *** 0.0065
No partner        -0.0080 0.0058 0.0008 0.0056
Partner, not married  -0.0024 0.0030 0.0013 0.0031
Children (reference is no child)
One child         -0.0003 0.0027 0.0127 *** 0.0027
Two children      0.0050 0.0034 0.0170 *** 0.0033
Three and more children  -0.0051 0.0045 0.0094 * 0.0041
Child under three years (yes) -0.0014 0.0076 -0.0384 *** 0.0097
Vocational Education (reference is no secondary schooling degree/
no vocational training)
Secondary school, no vocational education  0.0072 * 0.0035 0.0245 *** 0.0048
Secondary school, vocational education  0.0103 ** 0.0032 0.0393 *** 0.0052
GCSE, no vocational training  -0.0015 0.0045 0.0247 *** 0.0055
GCSE, vocational training  0.0014 0.0030 0.0425 *** 0.0052
A-levels, no vocational training  -0.0059 0.0088 -0.0011 0.0108
A-levels, vocational training  0.0071 0.0063 0.0418 *** 0.0083
A-levels, college  -0.0069 0.0059 0.0196 ** 0.0074
Cumulated duration of unempl., 02/2004 to 01/2005 (reference is 0 to 6 months)
7 to 12 months    0.0235 *** 0.0041 0.0331 *** 0.0050
Cumulated duration of unempl., 02/2000 to 01/2005 (reference is none)
1 to 6 months     0.0311 *** 0.0068 0.0090 0.0056
7 to 18 months    0.0251 *** 0.0071 0.0088 0.0061
19 to 30 months 0.0315 *** 0.0079 0.0144 * 0.0070
31 to 36 months   0.0206 ** 0.0080 0.0113 0.0076
37 to 48 months   0.0153 0.0080 0.0039 0.0076
Out-of-labour force during last year  -0.0125 *** 0.0028 -0.0074 * 0.0031
Cum. dur. neither empl. nor job-seeker, 01/2000 to 12/2004 (out-of-
labour-force) (reference is none)
1 to 6 months     -0.0123 *** 0.0023 -0.0133 *** 0.0027
7 to 12 months -0.0192 *** 0.0038 -0.0114 ** 0.0043
13 to 18 months -0.0121 ** 0.0046 -0.0148 ** 0.0050
19 to 24 months -0.0097 0.0053 -0.0059 0.0052
25 to 30 months -0.0207 *** 0.0063 -0.0068 0.0057
31 to 36 months   -0.0169 * 0.0067 0.0031 0.0068
37 to 42 months -0.0013 0.0074 0.0083 0.0077
43 to 60 months -0.0153 * 0.0076 -0.0020 0.0074
Cum. dur. of UI receipt from 02/2004 to 01/2005 (reference is none)
1 to 6 months     -0.0080 * 0.0035 -0.0105 ** 0.0041
7 to 9 months     -0.0011 0.0056 -0.0205 *** 0.0061
10 to 12 months   0.0001 0.0076 -0.0113 0.0082
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Probit Estimates for men and women in East Germany 
 
 
                    
                     marginal effect SE marginal effect SE
Cum. dur. of UI receipt from 02/2000 to 01/2004 (reference is none)
1 to 3 months     -0.0006 0.0038 0.0025 0.0036
4 to 12 months 0.0020 0.0034 -0.0042 0.0033
13 to 18 months   0.0096 * 0.0044 0.0121 * 0.0051
> 18 months       0.0059 0.0056 -0.0061 0.0063
Cum. dur. of UA receipt from 02/2004 to 01/2005 (reference is none)
1 to 3 months     0.0070 0.0071 -0.0046 0.0078
4 to 6 months     0.0095 0.0070 -0.0111 0.0073
7 to 9 months     -0.0046 0.0067 -0.0207 ** 0.0072
10 to 12 months   -0.0037 0.0068 -0.0187 * 0.0072
Cum. dur. of UA receipt from 02/2000 to 01/2004 (reference is none)
1 to 6 months     -0.0064 0.0039 -0.0090 * 0.0045
7 to 12 months    -0.0080 0.0043 -0.0158 *** 0.0048
13 to 30 months   -0.0134 ** 0.0044 -0.0198 *** 0.0048
31 to 42 months   -0.0159 ** 0.0053 -0.0260 *** 0.0057
43 to 48 months   -0.0242 *** 0.0061 -0.0277 *** 0.0064
UI ben. receipt, Dec. 31st 2004  -0.0166 ** 0.0061 0.0036 0.0072
UA ben. receipt, Dec. 31st 2004  0.0098 0.0054 0.0447 *** 0.0085
Cumulated dur. of regular employment 01/2000 to 12/2004 (reference is none)
1 to 6 months     0.0052 0.0034 0.0067 0.0039
7 to 12 months    -0.0032 0.0037 -0.0013 0.0044
13 to 18 months   -0.0108 ** 0.0041 -0.0109 * 0.0047
19 to 24 months   -0.0160 ** 0.0050 -0.0207 *** 0.0059
25 to 30 months   -0.0253 *** 0.0057 -0.0227 *** 0.0067
31 to 42 months   -0.0378 *** 0.0064 -0.0309 *** 0.0072
43 to 60 months   -0.0550 *** 0.0087 -0.0500 *** 0.0097
Interaction terms with age below 25
Under 25, no voc. training  -0.0072 0.0055 -0.0194 ** 0.0060
(reference is under 25, no regular employment)
Under 25, up to 12 months regular employment  -0.0100 0.0063 -0.0261 *** 0.0071
Under 25, more than 12 months regular employment  -0.0019 0.0084 -0.0340 *** 0.0087
ALMP participation in the last five years (yes)
Job creation schemes  0.0145 *** 0.0038 0.0189 *** 0.0048
Private employment subsidy  -0.0209 *** 0.0036 -0.0240 *** 0.0042
Further vocational training  0.0026 0.0026 0.0057 0.0030
Retraining        -0.0049 0.0044 -0.0073 0.0050
Short-term training (classroom)  -0.0032 0.0025 -0.0050 0.0027
Short-term training (practical)  -0.0056 0.0031 -0.0050 0.0036
Other short-term training  0.0065 0.0066 -0.0018 0.0074
Startup subsidy   -0.0304 *** 0.0057 -0.0384 *** 0.0072
Private placement service (§37), some tasks of placement  0.0017 0.0050 -0.0202 *** 0.0051
Private placement service (§37), all tasks of placement  -0.0008 0.0041 -0.0071 0.0044
Other ALMP        0.0318 *** 0.0057 0.0220 *** 0.0054
Time since end of last ALMP (reference is 1 to 6 months)
7 to 12 months    0.0114 *** 0.0034 0.0256 *** 0.0043
13 to 24 months   0.0094 ** 0.0033 0.0098 ** 0.0036
> 24 months       -0.0002 0.0028 0.0059 0.0031
Number of ALMPs  in last five years (reference is none)
One               0.0164 *** 0.0037 0.0215 *** 0.0042
Two               0.0294 *** 0.0055 0.0390 *** 0.0064
Three             0.0342 *** 0.0068 0.0423 *** 0.0078
Four              0.0350 *** 0.0081 0.0482 *** 0.0095
Five and more     0.0377 *** 0.0094 0.0498 *** 0.0109
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                     marginal effect SE marginal effect SE
Industry of last contributory job (reference is manufactoring)
Job with missing sector  -0.0077 0.0057 -0.0197 ** 0.0067
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, energy and water supply  0.0042 0.0050 -0.0203 ** 0.0064
Food and tobacco  0.0065 0.0102 -0.0230 ** 0.0083
Wood, paper, publishing, printing  0.0131 0.0113 -0.0086 0.0124
Chemical industry, engineering, vehical construction  0.0009 0.0092 0.0137 0.0149
Construction      -0.0148 *** 0.0044 -0.0229 ** 0.0072
Wholesale trade and car sales  -0.0110 0.0064 -0.0045 0.0086
Retail trade and hotels/restaurants  -0.0172 ** 0.0056 -0.0278 *** 0.0063
Transport and communication  -0.0053 0.0057 -0.0169 0.0087
Services for companies  -0.0032 0.0045 -0.0067 0.0060
Public adminstration, defence, social security agencies  0.0287 *** 0.0061 0.0190 ** 0.0066
Education         0.0009 0.0053 -0.0035 0.0063
Health care, veterinarian and social services  0.0254 *** 0.0068 0.0121 0.0064
Other services    0.0119 * 0.0048 0.0009 0.0059
Last professional status (reference isblue-collar worker)
Skilled worker / foreman  -0.0076 *** 0.0022 0.0019 0.0031
White-collar worker  -0.0091 ** 0.0033 -0.0009 0.0029
Part-time         -0.0052 * 0.0026 0.0048 0.0026
No job yet        0.0175 0.0096 -0.0257 ** 0.0098
Firm size of last contributory job (reference is 1 to 20 employees)
21 to 50 employees  0.0026 0.0028 0.0083 * 0.0034
51 to 100 employees  0.0035 0.0030 0.0027 0.0033
101 to 400 employees  0.0029 0.0026 0.0001 0.0028
> 400 employees   -0.0062 * 0.0031 -0.0037 0.0032
Missing           -0.0017 0.0043 -0.0080 0.0051
Last regular monthly real wage (deflated with CPI, 2000=100) (reference is none)
>0 to 500 Euro 0.0187 ** 0.0070 0.0088 0.0060
>500 to 1000 Euro 0.0330 *** 0.0061 0.0145 ** 0.0048
>1000 to 1500 Euro 0.0270 *** 0.0058 0.0203 *** 0.0050
>1500 to 2000 Euro 0.0179 ** 0.0059 0.0073 0.0058
> 2000 Euro 0.0053 0.0063 0.0008 0.0070
Time since end of last contributory job (reference is 1 to 6 months)
7 to 12 months    0.0074 0.0040 0.0033 0.0048
13 to 24 months   0.0179 *** 0.0041 -0.0010 .
25 to 36 months   0.0158 *** 0.0043 -0.0078 0.0046
37 to 48 months   0.0068 0.0042 -0.0075 0.0047
> 48 months       0.0040 0.0045 -0.0091 0.0051
Average duration of contributory jobs between 01/2000 and 12/2004 (reference is 1 to 6 months)
7 to 12 months    0.0082 ** 0.0028 0.0035 0.0032
13 to 24 months   0.0072 0.0037 0.0113 ** 0.0042
25 to 36 months   0.0019 0.0064 0.0243 ** 0.0081
37 to 60 months   0.0226 * 0.0103 0.0118 0.0113
Number of contributory jobs in last five years (reference is none)
One               -0.0022 0.0052 -0.0075 0.0054
Two               0.0040 0.0062 0.0074 0.0071
Three or more     0.0058 0.0072 0.0167 0.0092
Minor employment, Jan. 31st 2005  -0.0480 *** 0.0054 -0.0545 *** 0.0060
Partner's cum. Dur. Neither empl. Nor job-seeker nor unemployment 
benefit receipt (proxy for out-of-labour force), 01/2000 to 12/2004 (reference is none)
1 to 24 months    -0.0039 0.0033 -0.0060 * 0.0029
25 to 30 months   -0.0091 0.0067 0.0038 0.0093
31 to 36 months   -0.0008 0.0075 -0.0210 * 0.0085
37 to 42 months   -0.0039 0.0080 -0.0162 0.0092
43 to 60 months   -0.0125 ** 0.0044 -0.0141 ** 0.0049
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                     marginal effect SE marginal effect SE
Partner education (no secodary schooling degree/
no vocational training)
Secondary school, no vocational education  0.0019 0.0055 0.0008 0.0060
Secondary school, vocational education  0.0031 0.0055 0.0018 0.0053
GCSE or A-levels, vocational education or college  -0.0019 0.0049 0.0008 0.0051
Partner ID is missing 0.0055 0.0068 -0.0073 0.0072
Partner ID available but partner education is missing -0.0071 0.0056 -0.0075 0.0058
Partner unemployed, Jan. 31st 2005 -0.0041 0.0037 -0.0057 0.0036
Regional variables (district level)
Local unempl. rate in January 2005 -0.0019 *** 0.0004 -0.0012 * 0.0005
%age change in local unempl. rate in January 2005 -0.0010 *** 0.0002 -0.0014 *** 0.0002
Percentage of LTU in Jan. 2005 0.0000 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003
Total %age change of percentage of LTU in Jan. 2005 -0.0017 *** 0.0002 -0.0025 *** 0.0002
Vacancy-unemployment ratio  in January 2005 0.5950 *** 0.1482 0.6455 *** 0.1503
%age change vacancy-unemployment ratio  in January 2005 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(reference is Cities with below average 
LM conditions, high LTU)
Urban areas with average LM conditions  0.1251 *** 0.0167 0.0911 *** 0.0160
Rural areas with below average LM conditions  0.0560 *** 0.0060 0.0477 *** 0.0057
Rural areas in East Germany with severe LM conditions  0.0379 *** 0.0043 0.0252 *** 0.0037
Rural areas in East Germany with very severe LM conditions  0.0125 ** 0.0046 0.0075 0.0045
Proportion childcare under 3 0.0003 *** 0.0001 0.0002 * 0.0001
Looking for part-time job  -0.0118 ** 0.0037
AIC 37624.52 33953.85
BIC                  39041.49 35357.12
Number of Observations 82634 71088
Log of the Likelihood -18660.26 -16823.93
Pseudo R²            0.0773 0.0693
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001




Probit Estimates for men and women in West Germany 
 
 
                    
                     marginal effect SE marginal effect SE
Reference transitional probability 0.0881 0.0261
Age in years (reference is 15 to 20 years)
21-24             -0.0040 0.0041 -0.0009 0.0017
25-30             -0.0611 *** 0.0077 -0.0189 *** 0.0038
31-35             -0.0611 *** 0.0077 -0.0188 *** 0.0038
36-40             -0.0603 *** 0.0076 -0.0181 *** 0.0037
41-45             -0.0598 *** 0.0076 -0.0172 *** 0.0036
46-50             -0.0613 *** 0.0077 -0.0190 *** 0.0038
51-57             -0.0681 *** 0.0083 -0.0211 *** 0.0042
58-62             -0.0784 *** 0.0094 -0.0243 *** 0.0047
Impairment of health or disabled  -0.0113 *** 0.0019 -0.0037 *** 0.0011
Nationality (reference is German)
German with migration background  -0.0170 *** 0.0028 -0.0063 *** 0.0016
Turkish           -0.0425 *** 0.0046 -0.0126 *** 0.0024
former Soviet Union      -0.0196 *** 0.0039 -0.0111 *** 0.0023
Other foreigners  -0.0350 *** 0.0038 -0.0101 *** 0.0019
No partner        0.0019 0.0041 0.0184 *** 0.0034
Partner, not married  -0.0011 0.0026 0.0120 *** 0.0025
Children (reference is no child)
One child         -0.0037 0.0021 0.0010 0.0009
Two children      -0.0031 0.0024 0.0003 0.0011
Three and more children  -0.0004 0.0028 0.0005 0.0016
Child under three years (yes) -0.0027 0.0049 -0.0137 *** 0.0031
Vocational Education (reference is no secondary schooling degree/
no vocational training)
Secondary school, no vocational education  0.0005 0.0017 0.0051 *** 0.0013
Secondary school, vocational education  -0.0006 0.0018 0.0066 *** 0.0015
GCSE, no vocational training  -0.0035 0.0032 0.0046 ** 0.0018
GCSE, vocational training  -0.0063 * 0.0026 0.0058 *** 0.0016
A-levels, no vocational training  -0.0190 *** 0.0043 0.0048 0.0027
A-levels, vocational training  -0.0078 * 0.0036 0.0045 * 0.0021
A-levels, college  -0.0218 *** 0.0041 0.0022 0.0021
Cumulated duration of unempl., 02/2004 to 01/2005 (reference is 0 to 6 months)
7 to 12 months    0.0163 *** 0.0029 0.0092 *** 0.0020
Cumulated duration of unempl., 02/2000 to 01/2005 (reference is none)
1 to 6 months     0.0277 *** 0.0045 0.0065 *** 0.0018
7 to 18 months    0.0275 *** 0.0049 0.0081 *** 0.0022
19 to 30 months 0.0280 *** 0.0054 0.0109 *** 0.0028
31 to 36 months   0.0222 *** 0.0057 0.0071 * 0.0028
37 to 48 months   0.0216 *** 0.0060 0.0101 ** 0.0032
Out-of-labour force during last year  -0.0065 *** 0.0018 -0.0037 *** 0.0011
Cum. dur. neither empl. nor job-seeker, 01/2000 to 12/2004 (out-of-
labour-force) (reference is none)
1 to 6 months     -0.0076 *** 0.0017 -0.0019 0.0010
7 to 12 months -0.0168 *** 0.0028 -0.0053 *** 0.0016
13 to 18 months -0.0132 *** 0.0032 -0.0035 * 0.0016
19 to 24 months -0.0102 ** 0.0036 -0.0021 0.0017
25 to 30 months -0.0126 ** 0.0041 -0.0014 0.0018
31 to 36 months   -0.0023 0.0045 0.0025 0.0021
37 to 42 months 0.0020 0.0049 0.0018 0.0022
43 to 60 months -0.0027 0.0050 0.0019 0.0021
Cum. dur. of UI receipt from 02/2004 to 01/2005 (reference is none)
1 to 6 months     -0.0066 * 0.0027 -0.0010 0.0015
7 to 9 months     -0.0097 * 0.0039 -0.0035 0.0021
10 to 12 months   0.0009 0.0054 -0.0032 0.0025
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                     marginal effect SE marginal effect SE
Cum. dur. of UI receipt from 02/2000 to 01/2004 (reference is none)
1 to 3 months     0.0047 0.0029 -0.0010 0.0015
4 to 12 months -0.0002 0.0025 -0.0019 0.0013
13 to 18 months   0.0001 0.0032 -0.0052 ** 0.0018
> 18 months       -0.0017 0.0044 -0.0050 * 0.0023
Cum. dur. of UA receipt from 02/2004 to 01/2005 (reference is none)
1 to 3 months     -0.0004 0.0047 0.0063 0.0033
4 to 6 months     -0.0065 0.0044 0.0061 0.0033
7 to 9 months     -0.0146 *** 0.0044 0.0010 0.0028
10 to 12 months   -0.0112 * 0.0045 0.0039 0.0032
Cum. dur. of UA receipt from 02/2000 to 01/2004 (reference is none)
1 to 6 months     -0.0046 0.0027 -0.0006 0.0015
7 to 12 months    -0.0026 0.0031 -0.0043 * 0.0017
13 to 30 months   -0.0063 * 0.0031 -0.0072 *** 0.0019
31 to 42 months   -0.0128 ** 0.0040 -0.0106 *** 0.0024
43 to 48 months   -0.0224 *** 0.0047 -0.0128 *** 0.0028
UI ben. receipt, Dec. 31st 2004  -0.0031 0.0047 0.0079 ** 0.0030
UA ben. receipt, Dec. 31st 2004  0.0119 ** 0.0040 0.0045 0.0025
Cumulated dur. of regular employment 01/2000 to 12/2004 (reference is none)
1 to 6 months     0.0125 ** 0.0041 0.0023 0.0025
7 to 12 months    0.0079 0.0042 -0.0001 0.0024
13 to 18 months   0.0097 * 0.0046 -0.0012 0.0025
19 to 24 months   0.0046 0.0048 -0.0047 0.0025
25 to 30 months   0.0063 0.0056 -0.0066 * 0.0028
31 to 42 months   0.0008 0.0057 -0.0071 * 0.0029
43 to 60 months   -0.0160 * 0.0065 -0.0119 *** 0.0034
Interaction terms with age below 25
Under 25, no voc. training  -0.0004 0.0043 -0.0029 0.0020
(reference is under 25, no regular employment)
Under 25, up to 12 months regular employment  -0.0148 ** 0.0046 -0.0040 0.0022
Under 25, more than 12 months regular employment  -0.0131 ** 0.0049 -0.0035 0.0023
ALMP participation in the last five years (yes)
Job creation schemes  0.0252 *** 0.0043 0.0110 *** 0.0032
Private employment subsidy  -0.0121 *** 0.0027 -0.0037 * 0.0017
Further vocational training  0.0015 0.0020 0.0035 * 0.0014
Retraining        -0.0021 0.0033 0.0018 0.0019
Short-term training (classroom)  0.0047 * 0.0020 0.0014 0.0012
Short-term training (practical)  0.0035 0.0023 0.0032 * 0.0016
Other short-term training  0.0077 0.0043 0.0032 0.0026
Startup subsidy   -0.0287 *** 0.0040 -0.0117 *** 0.0027
Private placement service (§37), some tasks of placement  -0.0053 0.0027 -0.0035 * 0.0015
Private placement service (§37), all tasks of placement  -0.0051 0.0030 -0.0029 0.0016
Other ALMP        0.0273 *** 0.0042 0.0117 *** 0.0028
Time since end of last ALMP (reference is 1 to 6 months)
7 to 12 months    0.0126 *** 0.0027 0.0069 *** 0.0019
13 to 24 months   0.0094 *** 0.0026 0.0046 ** 0.0016
> 24 months       0.0070 ** 0.0023 0.0022 0.0013
Number of ALMPs  in last five years (reference is none)
One               0.0157 *** 0.0028 0.0039 ** 0.0015
Two               0.0217 *** 0.0039 0.0075 ** 0.0024
Three             0.0318 *** 0.0053 0.0078 ** 0.0029
Four              0.0355 *** 0.0064 0.0118 ** 0.0040
Five and more     0.0465 *** 0.0077 0.0198 *** 0.0056
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                     marginal effect SE marginal effect SE
Industry of last contributory job (reference is manufactoring)
Job with missing sector  -0.0021 0.0041 0.0012 0.0025
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, energy and water supply  0.0365 *** 0.0061 -0.0034 0.0042
Food and tobacco  0.0037 0.0054 -0.0028 0.0025
Wood, paper, publishing, printing  -0.0018 0.0052 0.0000 0.0035
Chemical industry, engineering, vehical construction  0.0009 0.0043 -0.0016 0.0031
Construction      0.0010 0.0030 0.0027 0.0038
Wholesale trade and car sales  -0.0045 0.0035 -0.0026 0.0023
Retail trade and hotels/restaurants  -0.0073 * 0.0033 -0.0007 0.0018
Transport and communication  -0.0082 * 0.0034 -0.0024 0.0027
Services for companies  0.0076 ** 0.0029 0.0024 0.0018
Public adminstration, defence, social security agencies  0.0568 *** 0.0067 0.0101 ** 0.0033
Education         0.0327 *** 0.0057 0.0112 *** 0.0032
Health care, veterinarian and social services  0.0422 *** 0.0057 0.0132 *** 0.0029
Other services    0.0166 *** 0.0039 0.0046 * 0.0022
Last professional status (reference is blue-collar worker)
Skilled worker / foreman  -0.0089 *** 0.0019 -0.0023 0.0016
White-collar worker  -0.0167 *** 0.0025 -0.0047 *** 0.0012
Part-time         -0.0006 0.0024 -0.0026 ** 0.0010
No job yet        0.0071 0.0065 0.0003 0.0034
Firm size of last contributory job (reference is 1 to 20 employees)
21 to 50 employees  0.0077 *** 0.0021 0.0024 * 0.0012
51 to 100 employees  0.0097 *** 0.0024 0.0048 ** 0.0015
101 to 400 employees  0.0056 ** 0.0020 0.0031 ** 0.0012
> 400 employees   0.0046 0.0025 0.0019 0.0013
Missing           -0.0023 0.0033 -0.0006 0.0020
Last regular monthly real wage (deflated with CPI, 2000=100) (reference is none)
>0 to 500 Euro 0.0225 *** 0.0049 0.0073 ** 0.0022
>500 to 1000 Euro 0.0275 *** 0.0043 0.0074 *** 0.0019
>1000 to 1500 Euro 0.0286 *** 0.0041 0.0075 *** 0.0019
>1500 to 2000 Euro 0.0174 *** 0.0036 0.0074 *** 0.0020
> 2000 Euro 0.0078 * 0.0035 0.0021 0.0019
Time since end of last contributory job (reference is 1 to 6 months)
7 to 12 months    0.0012 0.0029 -0.0008 0.0016
13 to 24 months   -0.0011 0.0025 -0.0003 0.0014
25 to 36 months   -0.0007 0.0027 0.0002 0.0015
37 to 48 months   -0.0049 0.0029 -0.0034 * 0.0017
> 48 months       -0.0101 ** 0.0035 -0.0035 0.0019
Average duration of contributory jobs between 01/2000 and 12/2004 (reference is 1 to 6 months)
7 to 12 months    0.0003 0.0020 0.0007 0.0013
13 to 24 months   -0.0066 * 0.0027 0.0024 0.0018
25 to 36 months   -0.0098 * 0.0044 -0.0018 0.0026
37 to 60 months   -0.0047 0.0057 0.0002 0.0036
Number of contributory jobs in last five years (reference is none)
One               -0.0120 * 0.0048 -0.0018 0.0029
Two               -0.0111 * 0.0053 -0.0017 0.0032
Three or more     -0.0111 * 0.0057 0.0026 0.0038
Minor employment, Jan. 31st 2005  -0.0379 *** 0.0041 -0.0145 *** 0.0026
Partner's cum. Dur. Neither empl. Nor job-seeker nor unemployment 
benefit receipt (proxy for out-of-labour force), 01/2000 to 12/2004 (reference is none)
1 to 24 months    -0.0001 0.0036 0.0020 0.0016
25 to 30 months   0.0134 * 0.0062 0.0065 0.0038
31 to 36 months   0.0110 0.0061 0.0055 0.0038
37 to 42 months   0.0189 ** 0.0064 0.0047 0.0037
43 to 60 months   0.0144 *** 0.0037 0.0063 ** 0.0023
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                     marginal effect SE marginal effect SE
Partner education (no secodary schooling degree/
no vocational training)
Secondary school, no vocational education  0.0022 0.0030 0.0005 0.0017
Secondary school, vocational education  -0.0018 0.0042 0.0033 0.0020
GCSE or A-levels, vocational education or college  -0.0019 0.0043 -0.0010 .
Partner ID is missing -0.0178 *** 0.0037 -0.0092 *** 0.0027
Partner ID available but partner education is missing -0.0121 *** 0.0031 -0.0060 ** 0.0023
Partner unemployed, Jan. 31st 2005 -0.0028 0.0027 -0.0011 0.0016
Regional variables (district level)
Local unempl. rate in January 2005 0.0017 *** 0.0003 0.0013 *** 0.0003
%age change in local unempl. rate in January 2005 -0.0010 *** 0.0001 -0.0004 *** 0.0001
Percentage of LTU in Jan. 2005 -0.0009 *** 0.0001 -0.0004 *** 0.0001
Total %age change of percentage of LTU in Jan. 2005 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Vacancy-unemployment ratio  in January 2005 -0.0964 *** 0.0269 -0.0129 0.0140
%age change vacancy-unemployment ratio  in January 2005 0.0001 *** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(reference is Cities with below average 
LM conditions, high LTU)
Cities in West Germany with average LM conditions  0.0162 *** 0.0031 0.0121 *** 0.0024
Cities in West Germany with above-average LM conditions  0.0528 *** 0.0062 0.0249 *** 0.0046
Urban areas with average LM conditions.  0.0290 *** 0.0036 0.0114 *** 0.0023
Rural areas in West Germany with average LM conditions  0.0627 *** 0.0062 0.0288 *** 0.0047
Rural areas with below average LM conditions  0.0310 *** 0.0052 0.0150 *** 0.0035
Rural areas in W. G. with above average LM conditions and high 
seasonal dynamics  0.1452 *** 0.0118 0.0431 *** 0.0070
Rural areas in W. G., very favourite LM cond., seasonal dynamics 
and low LTU  0.1009 *** 0.0101 0.0288 *** 0.0055
Rural areas in W. G., very favourite LM cond. and low LTU  0.0950 *** 0.0090 0.0350 *** 0.0059
Proportion of childcare under 3 0.0035 *** 0.0002 0.0006 *** 0.0001
Looking for part-time job  -0.0054 *** 0.0012
AIC                  38729.61 18537.01
BIC                  40247.28 19998.99
Number of Observations 124080 81791
Log of the Likelihood -19208.80 -9111.51
Pseudo R²            0.0833 0.0876
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001




Results of Regression Decomposition (grouped variables) 
 
 
Participation probability East  = 7.03%
Participation probability West  = 2.64%
Difference            = 4.38%
1
Decomposition Base





Explained Effect due to:
Age -1.00 -22.88% -0.82 -18.68% -0.30 6.8%
Interaction terms with age 0.26 5.82% 0.24 5.42% 0.01 -0.1%
Nationality 0.45 10.16% 0.41 9.45% -0.20 4.7%
Single 0.00 -0.02% -0.11 -2.49% 0.02 -0.4%
Children 0.19 4.36% 0.12 2.81% -0.01 0.3%
Education 0.65 14.87% 0.46 10.54% -0.10 2.2%
Health status 0.01 0.19% 0.01 0.17% -0.02 0.5%
Former unemployment 0.52 11.86% 0.61 13.82% -0.20 4.6%
Former out-of-labour-force 0.21 4.68% 0.20 4.56% -0.11 2.5%
Former benefit receipt -0.84 -19.18% -0.78 -17.71% 0.26 -5.9%
Unemployment benefit receipt 
31st December 2004 0.71 16.20% 0.51 11.64% -0.08 1.9%
Former employment 0.23 5.27% 0.25 5.78% -0.13 3.0%
Former ALMPs 1.04 23.69% 1.12 25.48% -0.65 14.7%
Last job 0.48 11.04% 0.43 9.86% -0.19 4.3%
Minor Employment 0.17 3.84% 0.17 3.82% 0.06 -1.3%
Partner information 0.00 0.03% 0.01 0.17% 0.07 -1.5%
Childcare facilities 0.29 6.60% 0.15 3.32% -1.02 23.2%
Regional information -0.71 -16.25% -0.50 -11.37% 0.16 -3.5%
Looking for part-time job 0.12 2.78% 0.14 3.26% -0.11 2.6%
1 These figures are in percentage points.
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